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DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT THEORY
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 7, 1976, the Supreme Court of the United States
announced its decision in Washington v. Davis,' and the implica-
tions of the Court's opinion are enormously consequential. The
Court rejected a nonmotivational theory of racial2 discrimination
(which I will refer to as the disproportionate racial impact
theory, or simply DRI theory), holding that the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibits only government
action undertaken with a "discriminatory purpose. '3 During the
1976 Term, the Supreme Court will again have occasion to con-
sider the disproportionate impact theory of racial discrimination.
The Court has agreed to review a ruling by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit striking down an ex-
clusionary land use decision on the ground that the decision
had the effect of reinforcing residential racial isolation.4 Thus,
it it especially important that an effort be made to explicate dis-
proportionate racial impact theory: the theory's underlying
premises; the flexible standard of review contemplated by the
theory; and the types of government action to which the theory,
196 S. Ct. 2040 (1976).
2 Throughout this Article reference is made to "racial" minorities and "racial" dis-
crimination. "Race" has been attacked as a misleading and outmoded term. See Bakke v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., Super. Ct. No. 31287, slip op. at 15-16 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Sept.
16, 1976). "Race" is used in this Article for want of a better term and because the issues
addressed here have arisen primarily with reference to "race" as the term is conven-
tionally understood. Perhaps disproportionate impact theory could be extended to
non-"racial" groups. See note 100 infra & accompanying text. Compare Anthony v. Mas-
sachusetts, 415 F. Supp. 485 (D. Mass. 1976) (veterans' preference invalidated because
of disproportionate impact on women), with Branch v. DuBois, 418 F. Supp. 1128 (N.D.
Ill. 1976) (veterans' preference upheld in face of disproportionate impact challenge).
The immediate concern, however, is the core application of the theory. Therefore the
discussion will proceed in terms of "race." Frequent reference will be made to blacks
because the application of DRI theory to actions disproportionately affecting blacks
serves as the paradigm for application to other minorities.
3 96 S. Ct. at 2050. A government action has a disproportionate racial impact if it
has the effect of disadvantaging a greater percentage of nonwhites than whites, or of
disadvantaging nonwhites much more grievously than whites. See note 4 infra. The term
"disproportionate impact" is preferable to "discriminatory effect," because the latter has
a pejorative connotation that tends to confuse two distinct issues: (1) whether an action
has a disproportionate impact or effect, and (2) whether a disproportionate impact is
justifiable. See Vulcan Soc'y of New York City Fire Dep't, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n,
490 F.2d 387, 391 n.4 (2d Cir. 1973).
4 Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409 (7th
Cir.), cert. granted, 423 U.S. 1030 (1975); see notes 181-92 infra & accompanying text.
The court of appeals refused to disturb the district court's finding that the exclusionary
decision was not motivated by a discriminatory purpose. Id. at 412. An action reinforc-
ing racial isolation is said to have a disproportionate racial impact, even though both
whites and nonwhites are kept separate, because racial isolation constitutes a much
greater disadvantage to the isolated minority than to the majority.
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if accepted, would apply. The point of departure for the discus-
sion is Washington. My concern is less that the Court in Wash-
ington reached the result it did than that, in arriving at that re-
sult, it failed to address the crucial underlying issues.
II. WASHINGTON V. DAVIS
A. The Decision
In Washington v. Davis, two black men who had been denied
positions as police officers with the Metropolitan Police Depart-
ment of the District of Columbia because of their failure to per-
form satisfactorily on Test 21, a written examination used by
the Department in selecting candidates for its Recruit School,
claimed that the Department's use of the written examination
violated their rights under the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. 5 Seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, they ar-
gued that use of the test was unconstitutional, because a greater
proportion of blacks than whites failed to perform satisfactorily
on it and because the test did not bear a demonstrable relation to
job performance. The plaintiffs made no claim of intentional or
purposeful racial discrimination.
6
Test 21 was developed by the United States Civil Service
Commission for general use throughout federal civil service as a
measure of verbal ability.7 The test is not related specifically to
5 The plaintiffs, challenging federal action, relied on the equal protection compo-
nent of the fifth amendment due process clause. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954). The plaintiffs based their case on 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) as well as on the fifth
amendment. Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 957-58 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd, 96
S. Ct 2040 (1976). Neither the district nor the circuit court discussed the relevance of
§ 1981 to the underlying complaint. Plaintiffs did not rely on Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-16 to 2000e-17 (Supp. V 1975), which was not applicable to government em-
ployment at the time the suit was commenced. At oral argument before the Supreme
Court, defendants' counsel indicated that the applicability of Title VII to the instant
case was problematic because plaintiffs had not satisfied its procedural requirements. 96
S. Ct. at 2047 n.10.
The defendants pointed out to the district court that 5 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(1) (1970),
which was not invoked by the plaintiffs, requires, in effect, that federal civil service
examinations be job-related within the meaning of Title VII and Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 96 S. Ct. at 2052 n.15. The Supreme Court, in addition to
rejecting plaintiffs' constitutional theory, held that Test 21 passed statutory muster
under § 3304(a)(1) and, by implication, under Tide VII. The Court accepted the dis-
trict court's conclusion that the job-relatedness requirement was satisfied by the positive
relationship between performance on Test 21 and performance in the police training
program. Id. at 2052-54.
6 96 S. Ct. at 2045.
' A copy of Test 21 (Series No. 173, Feb. 1970) appears in the appendix to Judge
Robb's dissenting opinion to the appeals court opinion. 512 F.2d at 967-76.
DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT THEORY
police work, and the Metropolitan Police Department did not
participate in development of the test.8 Between 1968 and 1971,
57% of black applicants for positions with the Department failed
Test 21; only 13% of white and other applicants failed.9 Revers-
ing the district court's order that granted the defendants' motion
for summary judgment, the court of appeals ruled that use of
Test 21 was unconstitutional in that it had not been shown to
bear a demonstrable relation to ability to perform on the job.10
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of ap-
peals had applied the wrong legal standard-a statutory stan-
dard applicable in Title VII" cases-in resolving the constitu-
tional issue.' 2 Under Title VII a showing of disproportionate
racial impact puts the burden on the employer to establish that
the challenged hiring or promotion practice bears a demonstra-
ble relation to job performance.' 3 A Title VII plaintiff need not
claim intentional or purposeful discrimination.' 4 In Washington,
the Supreme Court held that a showing of disproportionate im-
pact is not sufficient to make out a constitutional claim of racial
discrimination; a claimant must establish "discriminatory pur-
pose. '"15 Absent such a showing, the government need establish
only that the challenged action has a rational basis.' 6 The Court
cited as authority cases involving constitutional claims of racial
discrimination in jury selection, 17 legislative districting, 18 public
8 96 S. Ct. at 2045.
' 512 F.2d at 958-59. Test 21 is administered throughout federal civil service. Be-
tween 1970 and 1971, outside the District of Columbia, the proportion of blacks failing
Test 21 was 47%, while the proportion of whites and others failing was only 12%. Id. at
959 n.10.
" The district court, in denying the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment
(which presented only the constitutional issue) and granting the defendants' motion for
summary judgment (which disputed the constitutional claim and asserted compliance
with all applicable statutory criteria), held it sufficient, for constitutional and statutory
purposes, that Test 21 measured ability to pass written examinations administered dur-
ing the training program. Davis v. Washington, 348 F. Supp. 15 (D.D.C. 1972). The
Supreme Court sided with the district court with respect to the sufficiency, for statutory
purposes, of training-program validation. 96 S. Ct. at 2052-54.
11 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-16 to
2000e-17 (Supp. V 1975).
"Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice Stewart, without opin-
ion, joined that part of the Court's opinion addressing the constitutional issue. Justice
Stevens joined the Court's opinion with a single exception noted in his concurring opin-
ion. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented from the Court's opinion as
to the statutory issues, but declined to address the constitutional issue.
13 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
14 Id.
15 96 S. Ct. at 2047.
161d. at 2051.
17 See notes 123-31 infra & accompanying text.
" See notes 132-42 infra & accompanying text.
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school administration,' 9 and welfare policy, 20 and sought to dis-
tinguish cases intimating a rule contrary to that announced in
Washington .21
The Court barely proffered an argument to support its re-
jection of disproportionate impact theory of racial discrimina-
tion. Justice White, in addition to citing prior cases that he mis-
takenly thought were relevant to the issue at hand,22 observed
that a disproportionate impact rule, if accepted, might have the
effect of invalidating a wide range of legislative programs. 23 The
Court thought that "extension of the rule beyond those areas
where it is already applicable by reason of statute, such as in the
field of public employment, should await legislative prescrip-
tion. ' 24 That observation, coupled with the Court's concession,
without discussion, that "there is another side to the issue, "25
was all that the Court said in rejecting the disproportionate
racial impact theory of equal protection, a theory that had been
endorsed in some form by eight circuits 26 and had not even been
challenged by the defendants in Washington.27 Surely an issue
of such importance deserved considerably more attention than
the Court gave it.
B. The Pre-Washington Confusion
Considerable uncertainty existed prior to Washington in re-
gard to whether the principal element of a constitutional claim
of racial discrimination was discriminatory purpose or simply
discriminatory effect. 28 In Gomillion v. Lightfoot,2 9 the Supreme
Court struck down an Alabama statute changing the boundaries
19 See notes 150-72 infra & accompanying text.
See notes 114-20 infra & accompanying text.
21 See notes 36-49 infra & accompanying text.
22 See notes 127-42 infra & accompanying text.
23 96 S. Ct. at 2051-52.
24 Id. at 2052.
2 Id. at 2050. The Court cited federal circuit and district court opinions accepting
some variant of disproportionate racial impact theory. Id. at 2050 n. 12.
21 See cases cited notes 88-90 infra.
2 See 96 S. Ct. at 2046-47 & n.8. The defendants argued only that the requirement
of job-relatedness had been met.
28 Compare Note, Legislative Purpose and Federal Constitutional Adjudication, 83 HARV.
L. REv. 1887 (1970) (assuming that a law is unconstitutional if it has a disproportionate
racial impact and arguing that discriminatory purpose can be probative of dispropor-
tionate impact, on the theory that the purpose will generate the effect), with Ely,
Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1221
n.51 (1970) (disproportionate impact is evidence of racial motivation, which is the
proper constitutional issue).
29 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
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of the city of Tuskegee from a square to "a strangely irregular
twenty-eight-sided figure .... The essential inevitable effect of this
redefinition of Tuskegee's boundaries is to remove from the city
all save only four or five of its 400 Negro voters while not remov-
ing a single white voter or resident. '3° Justice Frankfurter ruled
that because of "this inevitable effect,"'" the statute, in violation
of the fifteenth amendment, deprived the black voters of Tus-
kegee of their right to vote. Nowhere in the Court's opinion did
Justice Frankfurther mention discriminatory purpose. 2
Eight years later, in United States v. O'Brien,33 the Court
fueled the purpose-effect confusion by declaring that in Go-
million, "the purpose of the legislation was irrelevant, because the
inevitable effect-the 'necessary scope and operation' . . . -
abridged constitutional rights. '34 Gomillion, the O'Brien Court
asserted, stands "not for the proposition that legislative motive is
a proper basis for declaring a statute unconstitutional, but that
the inevitable effect of a statute on its face may render it uncon-
stitutional.
35
In Palmer v. Thompson,36 one of two cases distinguished in
Washington,*7 the Court upheld an action by Jackson, Mississippi,
closing the municipal swimming pools. The city had been or-
dered to desegregate its pools and chose instead to shut them
down in order "to preserve peace and order and because the
pools could not be operated economically on an integrated
basis. '38 Justice Black, for the majority, rejected the claim that
the city's action violated the equal protection clause because it
was racially motivated. The closing of the pools involved no ra-
cial classification, nor did it "[affect] blacks differently from
whites. '39 In response to the complainants' motive-based argu-
ment, Justice Black said:
It is true there is language is some of our cases
interpreting the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
which may suggest that the motive or purpose behind a
"°Id. at 341 (emphasis supplied).
31 1d. at 342.
32 It is clear, however, that Justice Frankfurter was implicitly referring to dis-
criminatory purpose. See notes 50-54 infra & accompanying text.
33 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
34 Id. at 385 (citation omitted).
3
5Id. at 384.
36 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
37 96 S. Ct. at 2049-50.
38 403 U.S. at 219.
19 Id. at 225.
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law is relevant to its constitutionality. . . .But the focus
in those cases was on the actual effect of the enact-
ments, not upon the motivation which led the States to
behave as they did.
40
In Wright v. Council of Emporia,4 1 the second case distin-
guished in Washington,42 the Court invalidated the withdrawal
by Emporia, Virginia from the surrounding county school sys-
tem. Emporia had acted in response to a district court order
directing the county system to discontinue its "freedom of
choice" desegregation plan and to adopt a "pairing" plan. 43 The
Court found the "discriminatory effect" 44 of Emporia's with-
drawal, making the desegregation of the county system more
difficult, dispositive of the constitutional claim: "[W]e have fo-
cused upon the effect-not the purpose or motivation-of a
school board's action in determining whether it is a permissible
method of dismantling a dual system. The existence of a permis-
sible purpose cannot sustain an action that has an impermissible
effect."
45
The language of Gomillion, O'Brien, Palmer, and Wright sug-
gests that the chief element of a constitutional claim of racial
discrimination is discriminatory effect, not discriminatory pur-
pose. Nonetheless, in Washington, the Court correctly perceived
that no prior Supreme Court case had really been based on the
proposition that discriminatory effect alone is sufficient to make
out a constitutional claim of racial discrimination. In Wright,
Emporia shared the county's affirmative duty to undo the conse-
quences of past de jure segregation. Emporia's withdrawal con-
travened that affirmative duty by making more difficult the de-
segregation of the county school system. This affirmative duty
devolved on Emporia only because of Emporia's prior complicity
in maintaining the segregated county system. This complicity in
"an independent constitutional violation, '46 and not discrimina-
tory effect per se, was the predicate of the Court's order voiding
Emporia's withdrawal from the county school system.
The city action upheld in Palmer was not based on a racial
classification, nor did it have a disproportionate impact on
40 d. (citations omitted).
41 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
42 96 S. Ct. at 2049-50.
41407 U.S. at 455-56.
44 Id. at 461.
45 Id. at 462.
46Id. at 459.
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blacks. The pools were closed to all, and the city was not covertly
supporting "private" swimming clubs. 47 Furthermore, the articu-
lated objective of the closing was legitimate. The basis of the
Court's opinion in Palmer was not absence of discriminatory ef-
fect, but the fact that the closing involved no racial classification
and was rationally related to a legitimate objective. The Court
declined to strike down an action that involved no racial classifi-
cation and that was rationally related to a legitimate objective,
merely because the motives of some who took the action might
have been regrettable. 48 The Court held, in effect, that whatever
the actors' hidden motives, the absence of a racial classification
and the presence of a rational relation to a legitimate objective
precludes a finding of discriminatory purpose.49
In Gomillion, the Alabama legislature redefined the city
limits of Tuskegee. The new boundaries excluded from old
Tuskegee all except four or five black voters but not a single
previous white voter. The only plausible function served by the
irregular boundaries was racial selection for the purpose of dis-
enfranchisement. Alabama "never suggested, either in [its] brief
or in oral argument, any countervailing municipal function
which [the boundaries were] designed to serve."5° Thus the
boundaries were the functional equivalent of a racial criterion;
the inference was inescapable that the boundaries were em-
ployed to serve the very function race would have served.
Justice Frankfurter recognized this. Although he was not
speaking specifically in terms of discriminatory purpose his con-
clusion in that regard was unmistakable. He declared that "the
legislation is solely concerned with segregating white and colored
voters by fencing Negro citizens out of town so as to deprive them
of their pre-existing municipal vote."' 5 1 In addition, he observed:
"[T]he Alabama Legislature ... has deprived the petitioners of
the municipal franchise and consequent rights and to that end it
has incidentally changed the city's boundaries .... [S]tate power
[has been] used as an instrument for circumventing a federally
protected right. '52 The O'Brien Court's reading of Gomillion as
47 403 U.S. at 222-23.
48 But see Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional
Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. REv. 95 (criticizing Palmer, arguing that illicit motiva-
tion should be dispositive in certain circumstances).
49 See generally Ely, supra note 28.
50 364 U.S. 339, 342 (1960).
5 1 1d. at 341 (emphasis supplied).52 Id. at 347 (emphasis supplied).
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resting on discriminatory effect and not purpose 53 is simply in-
correct. The use of a veiled racial criterion, not the effect of the
statute, was unconstitutional.
54
To say that the Court in Washington correctly perceived the
absence of any precedent among its cases for disproportionate
racial impact theory is not to say that the Court was justified in
rejecting the theory as curtly as it did. Precedents have never
been regarded as the alpha and omega of constitutional
decisionmaking.5 5 The Court, confronted possibly for the first
time by an equal protection claim based solely on a nonmotiva-
tional theory of racial discrimination, 56 tendered a response not
commensurate with the importance and complexity of the issues.
III. THE MOTIVATIONAL MODES OF
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
The Washington Court noted that "[t]he central purpose of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is
the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of
race."57 There is absolutely no doubt that the central concern of
the equal protection clause is racial discrimination, 5 but what
constitutes "conduct discriminating on the basis of race," remains
unclear. That phrase could encompass conduct having a dispro-
portionate racial impact.
The Washington Court held that there is no discrimination
within the meaning of the equal protection clause without "dis-
criminatory purpose. ' 59 The "discriminatory purpose" terminol-
ogy used in Washington and elsewhere, however, is misleading.
The central prohibition of the equal protection clause is directed
against the government's deliberate use of race as a criterion of
selection.6 0 A law might employ a racial criterion of selection as a
means to an objective, or purpose, having nothing to do with
" See notes 33-35 supra & accompanying text.
51 The effect of a statute, however, can be crucial in establishing that a criterion of
selection is the functional equivalent of race-that the criterion's only plausible function
is racial selection-and, therefore, that a discriminatory purpose is present. See Ely,
supra note 28, at 1268.
" See generally P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES
AND MATERIALS 1118-29 (1975).
'6 The plaintiffs made no claim of intentional or purposeful racial discrimination;
they relied solely on disproportionate impact. 96 S. Ct. at 2045.
57 
Id. at 2047.
5 8 See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1880); Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71-72 (1873).
'9 See note 2 supra & accompanying text.
60 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967).
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race. Such a law does not have a discriminatory purpose but,
because it employs a racial criterion, is nonetheless subject to
strict scrutiny. 61 Or the racial criterion may be a means to a
"benign" racial objective, in which case the "discriminatory" pur-
pose is to benefit rather than to discriminate against the racial
minority.62 Thus, "discriminatory purpose" refers to the deliber-
ate use by government of race as a criterion of selection; if this
use is to be sustained, it requires a compelling objective that
cannot be achieved without the racial criterion.
The presumptive invalidity of race as an criterion of selec-
tion derives from the notion embodied in the fourteenth
amendment that one should be judged not as a member of a
particular racial group, but as an individual. The basis of this
individualist ethic is not the absence of legislatively relevant dif-
ferences among races. 63 Instead, the basis is the intolerably great
moral cost of permitting government to deal with individuals as
members of particular racial groups. Historically, the use of race
61 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). The objective of the chal-
lenged wartime relocation order was not discrimination but military security. A racial
criterion of selection was used to achieve that objective. The order was upheld because
only the means, and not the purpose, was discriminatory. Id. at 216, 223.
62 The validity of racial classifications designed for remedial purposes remains un-
clear. A cogent argument has been made that even the use of race as a criterion of
selection to achieve a "benign" objective should be deemed presumptively unconstitu-
tional because the very use of the racial criterion encourages racialism. See Kaplan,
Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro-The Problem of Special Treatment,
61 Nw. U.L. Rv. 363, 379-80 (1966):
[A]ny legal classification by race weakens the government as an educative
force.... [A] statute specifically granting Negroes a benefit tends to under-
mine the principle we are working so hard to establish [that a person is en-
titled to be judged on his individual merit alone, that race is irrelevant to the
worth of the individual]. Preference for Negroes can thus be expected to be a
major factor in preventing the education we are trying to bring about through
a host of other laws.
In Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center, 39 N.Y.2d 326, 384 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1976) (sustain-
ing preferential admissions to medical school), the court stated:
Granting preferential treatment to some racial groups encourages polarization
of the races. Likewise, such treatment perpetuates thinking in racial terms and
tends to undermine the incentive among those in the discriminated group to
strive to improve their lot. ... Hence, preferential treatment programs involve
perpetuating undesirable perceptions of race as criteria affecting State action
• . . and, therefore, should be subjected to more careful scrutiny than tradi-
tional standards of rationality ordinarily invoke.
Id. at 335-36, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 90 (citations omitted). Moreover, when the resources are
scarce, a law favoring one racial group necessarily disfavors another. Thus "benignness"
is surely relative. See, e.g., Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., Super. Ct. No. 31287
(Cal. Sup. Ct. Sept. 16, 1976) (medical school's minority admission program violates
fourteenth amendment); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973)
(sustaining preferential admissions to law school), dismissed as moot, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
6 This individualist ethic does imply that there are few, if any, relevant differences.
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as a criterion of selection has been part of an effort by the
majority race to disadvantage a minority race.64 Moreover, the
use of race as a criterion of selection encourages racialism, the
mental habit of thinking about and dealing with persons of races
other than one's own, not as individuals, but as "blacks,"
"whites," and so forth. This habit of mind is the soil in which
discriminatory practices grow.
A. Rehearsing the Obvious: Race as a Criterion of Selection
on the Face or in the Administration of a Law
Of the various ways in which government might employ
race as a criterion of selection, the most obvious is the drafting
of racial criteria into the language of a statute or other rule. In
Strauder v. West Virginia,6 5 the statute struck down by the
Supreme Court provided that "[a]ll white male persons who are
twenty-one years of age and who are citizens of this State shall be
liable to serve as jurors. ' 66 The statutes struck down in Loving v.
Virginia 7 and McLaughlin v. Florida,68 unlike the statute in
Strauder, did not by their terms include or exclude a specific
racial group, but the statutes' language nonetheless set forth a
racial criterion of selection. In Loving, the statute forbade inter-
racial marriage; in McLaughlin, the statute imposed a severer
penalty for interracial cohabitation than for cohabitation with a
member of one's own race.
In Hunter v. Erickson,69 the city charter provision invalidated
by the Court, like the provisions in Loving and McLaughlin, did
not refer to a particular racial group and thus was not racially
specific. It did employ, however, a racial criterion. Under the
charter provision, any city ordinance regulating real estate trans-
actions "on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or
ancestry must first be approved by a majority of the electors
voting on the question at a regular or general election before
such ordinance shall be effective. '70 Thus, whether the racial
criterion employed is racially specific, as in Strauder, or non-
specific, as in Loving, McLaughlin, and Hunter, the operative
64 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
65 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
66 Id. at 305.
67 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
68 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
69 393 U.S. 385 (1969).7 Id. at 387 (emphasis supplied).
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constitutional rule remains the same: the deliberate use by gov-
ernment of race as a criterion of selection is presumptively
unconstitutional.71
Even when the language of a provision is free of racial
criteria, it is possible that government officials will use race as
a criterion in administering the rule. In the classic case of Yick
Wo v. Hopkins,72 a San Francisco ordinance required an indi-
vidual who wished to operate a laundry in a structure other
than a brick or stone building to obtain a permit from the
Board of Supervisors. The Board had granted permits to oper-
ate laundries in wooden buildings to all but one of eighty non-
Chinese applicants but to none of about two hundred Chinese
applicants. The Board gave no reason for this disparity, and the
Supreme Court, reversing petitioners' convictions for violating
the ordinance, concluded that no plausible reason existed "ex-
cept hostility to the race and nationality to which the petitioners
belong, and which in the eye of the law is not justified.
73
B. "'X" as a Criterion of Selection Where "X" Is
the Functional Equivalent of Race
A shrewd agency of government, intent on discriminating
against a racial minority, will not specify race as a criterion of
selection in the terms of a law. It will employ instead some criter-
ion that serves substantially the same function-racial selection.
Many laws have been invalidated because they employed a
veiled racial criterion-an "X," the functional equivalent of race.
Gomillion v. Ligh foot 74 involved a prime example of this device.75
71 For a brief discussion of the application of this rule to benign racial classifica-
tions, see note 62 supra. The use of a racially nonspecific criterion of selection is quite
properly not exempt from the general rule against racial classifications. Such racial
criteria, as Loving, McLaughlin, and Hunter amply demonstrate, have all the vices of the
racially specific criterion struck down in Strauder. Typically, they serve to disadvantage
directly a racial minority, as in Hunter, or to express white supremacist ideology, as in
Loving and McLaughlin. Moreover, such criteria undermine the effort to establish col-
orblindness in our socio-political life. See note 62 & text accompanying note 64 supra.
72 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
7 1id. at 374. Of course, establishing that officials are using race as a criterion of
selection can present difficult evidentiary problems. Reliance on statistical data has be-
come commonplace in efforts to establish use of a racial criterion in the administration
of a written rule facially neutral with respect to race. See, e.g., Mayor of Philadelphia v.
Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 620 (1974): "Statistical analyses have served
and will continue to serve an important role as one indirect indicator of racial discrimi-
nation in access to service on governmental bodies, particularly where, as in the case of
jury service, the duty to serve falls equally on all citizens."
74 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
"'See notes 50-54 supra & accompanying text.
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In Guinn v. United States,76 the Supreme Court invalidated a
"grandfather clause" provision of the Oklahoma Constitution
requiring a literacy test of all prospective voters except those
who had been qualified to vote on or before January 1, 1866
(prior to the adoption of the fifteenth amendment), and their
lineal descendants. In Lane v. Wilson,77 the Court struck down an
Oklahoma voter registration statute, enacted in response to
Guinn, exempting those who had voted in the last general elec-
tion prior to Guinn. The Court decried "sophisticated as well as
simple-minded modes of discrimination. '78 In Schnell v. Davis,79
the Court affirmed a district court judgment" invalidating an
Alabama constitutional amendment requiring all prospective
voters to "understand and explain" any provision of the Federal
Constitution. The only plausible function served by that extra-
ordinary requirement, administered by local registrars, was the
disenfranchisement of black voters. The campaign to ratify the
amendment clearly indicated that this disenfranchisement was
the sole purpose for the amendment.8' As the Court later re-
marked,
[A] literacy test may be unconstitutional on its face. In
Davis v. Schnell, . . the test was the citizen's ability to
"understand and explain" an article of the Federal Con-
stitution. The legislative setting of that provision and
the great discretion it vested in the registrar made clear
that a literacy requirement was merely a device to make
racial discrimination easy.8 2
7;238 U.S. 347 (1915).
77 307 U.S. 268 (1939).78 1d. at 275.
79 336 U.S. 933 (1949) (per curiam).
o 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala. 1949).
81 See id. at 879 n.9, 880.
82 Lassiter v. Northampton Bd. of Election, 360 U.S. 45, 53 (1959). The delegation
of too much discretion to local registrars has been treated by the Court as the equivalent
of racial selection. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
An interesting early example of the functional equivalence rationale is found in the
lower federal court case of Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879)
(No. 6546), which involved a San Francisco ordinance requiring every male imprisoned
in the county jail to have his hair "cut or clipped to a uniform length of one inch from
the scalp thereof." Id. at 253. Plaintiff had defaulted on a fine imposed for a housing
code violation and was imprisoned and shorn of his braided queue, the deprivation of
which was regarded by certain Chinese persons at the time as a mark of disgrace. In
sustaining plaintiff's action against the sheriff for damages, the circuit court reasoned
that the only conceivable function served by the ordinance was discrimination against
the Chinese:
The cutting off the hair of every male person within an inch of his scalp,
on his arrival at the jail, was not intended and cannot be maintained as a
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Whether or not a criterion of selection, "X," is the functional
equivalent of race, then, depends on whether or not "X" plausi-
bly serves some function other than racial selection. Certainly,
the answer is not always clear.83 If a criterion plausibly serves no
function other than racial selection, then the criterion is the
functional equivalent of race, and its use necessitates the conclu-
sion that government has employed a veiled racial criterion. The
equal protection clause clearly forbids the deliberate use by gov-
ernment of race as a criterion of selection. This prohibition is
not avoided merely because the racial criterion is covert.
IV. BEYOND THE TRADITIONAL MODES:
NONMOTIVATIONAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
A. "X" as a Criterion of Selection Where "X"
Has a Disproportionate Racial Impact
Thus far the varieties of racial discrimination considered
have involved a motivational element-an intent or purpose to
sanitary regulation. The act by itself has no tendency to promote discipline,
and can only be a measure of health in exceptional cases. Had the ordinance
contemplated a mere sanitary regulation it would have been limited to such
cases and made applicable to females as well as to males, and to persons await-
ing trial as well as to persons under conviction....
,. . It is special legislation on the part of the supervisors against a class of
persons who, under the constitution and laws of the United States, are entitled
to the equal protection of the laws. The ordinance was intended only for the
Chinese in San Francisco. This was avowed by the supervisors on its passage,
and was so understood by every one. The ordinance is known in the commun-
ity as the "Queue Ordinance," being so designated from its purpose to reach
the queues of the Chinese, and it is not enforced against any other persons.
The reason advanced for its adoption, and now urged for its continuance, is,
that only the dread of the loss of his queue will induce a Chinaman to pay his
fine.
Id. at 254-55.
If the charter provision struck down in Hunter v. Erickson, see notes 69-70 supra &
accompanying text, had not been phrased explicitly in terms of race, but instead had
specified "fair housing legislation" as subject to the referendum gauntlet, cf. Reitman v.
Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (proposition 14 provided that "[n]either the State nor any
subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit or abridge, directly or indirectly, the
right of any person, who is willing or desires to sell, lease or rent any part or all of his
real property, to decline to sell, lease or rent such property to such person or persons
as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses."), the functional equivalence rationale would
have dictated the same result. The only plausible function of such a criterion of selec-
tion ("fair housing legislation" or the equivalent language in Reitman) is to burden the
passage of legislation beneficial to racial and religious minorities and thereby to facili-
tate private discrimination.
83 Courts occasionally have been unreasonably deferential to implausible claims that
the criterion in issue served a function other than racial selection and discrimination.
See Ely, supra note 28, at 1298. Compare Deerfield Park Dist. v. Progress Dev. Corp., 22'
Ill. 2d 132, 174 N.E.2d 850 (1961), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 968 (1963), with Banks v. Perk,
341 F. Supp. 1175 (N.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 473 F.2d 910 (6th Cir.
1973).
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use race as a criterion of selection. This element, when it is
ascertainable at all, will appear in the terms of a law or will be
inferrable from the administration or singular function of a law.
The variety of discrimination that DRI theory subjects to closer
scrutiny involves no such motivational element. 84 DRI theory
applies to government action when an intent or purpose to use a
racial criterion of selection, even if present, is not inferrable
from the administration or operation of a law and thus is not
visible to the reviewing court.
Laws having a disproportionate racial impact differ funda-
mentally from laws employing a criterion of selection that is the
functional equivalent of race. A criterion is the functional equi-
valent of race when its only plausible function is racial selection.
DRI theory applies to those laws whose criteria of selection
plausibly serve functions other than racial selection. For exam-
ple, a written examination for public employment may serve the
function of racial selection, but it also serves the function of
selecting a more skilled work force. While the neighborhood
criterion in student assignment decisions serves the function of
racial selection, it also serves the function of securing the advan-
tages thought to accompany neighborhood schools. 85 Similarly,
an affluent suburb's decision preventing the construction of low
income housing, in addition to fencing most blacks out of the
predominantly white enclave, secures the myriad advantages of
low density living.86 When a criterion of selection plausibly
serves at least two distinct functions, only one of which is racial
selection and the others are conventionally regarded as legiti-
mate, a court cannot fairly conclude that the criterion was used
for the purpose of racial selection.87
DRI theory has been developed by the lower federal courts,
principally in three sorts of cases: those challenging (1) racial
imbalance in public schools, (2) hiring practices in public em-
ployment, and (3) exclusionary land use decisions. At least five
federal circuit court have applied variants of DRI theory in over-
turning decisions by school boards that plainly served legitimate
functions-chiefly maintenance of neighborhood schools-but
4 For a discussion of school desegregation cases that use a motivational fiction
equivalent to a nonmotivational impact analysis, see notes 165-72 infra & accompanying
text.
85 See note 162 infra.
86 Cf. Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (upholding a zoning regulation limit-
ing land use to one-family dwellings).
8 7 See note 49 supra & accompanying text.
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that had the effect of creating racially imbalanced schools.88
Prior to Washington v. Davis, at least four courts of appeals and a
district court had applied DRI theory in striking down public
employment hiring practices that served legitimate functions but
that disqualified a greater percentage of nonwhite than white
applicants. 8 9 And at least three circuit courts have applied DRI
theory in overturning decisions with respect to zoning and public
housing that served legitimate functions but that reinforced re-
sidential racial isolation in the affected communities.90
B. The Underlying Premises of
Disproportionate Racial Impact Theory
As noted earlier, the traditional prohibition of equal protec-
tion is directed at the deliberate use by government of race as a
criterion of selection. The corresponding duty of the govern-
ment is negative in character: to refrain from using race, absent
compelling justification, as a criterion of selection. In this re-
spect, the traditional prohibition of equal protection is narrower
than the prohibition of the first amendment. Under the first
amendment, a legislature not only must refrain from using
speech, association, and religion as criteria of selection-that is,
as bases for penalizing or rewarding individuals91-but also must
affirmatively accommodate first amendment interests by pursu-
ing its objective through means that minimize adverse effects on
"SSee, e.g., United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 532 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1976);
United States v. School Dist. of Omaha, 521 F.2d 530 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
946 (1975); Hart v. Community School Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975); Mor-
gan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975); Oliver v.
Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963
(1975). But see Johnson v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 500 F.2d 349 (9th Cir.
1974). For a discussion of these cases, see notes 165-72 infra & accompanying text.
" See, e.g., Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd, 96 S. Ct. 2040
(1976); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972); Chance v. Board of Examiners,
458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 950 (1972); Harper v. Mayor of Baltimore, 359 F. Supp. 1187 (D. Md.),
modified sub nom. Harper v. Kloster, 486 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1973). But cf. Tyler v.
Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2660 (1976) (dispropor-
tionate failure of blacks to pass bar exam not sufficient to make out an equal protection
claim).
"See, e.g., Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517
F.2d 409 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 560 (1975), discussed in notes 181-92 infra &
accompanying text; Crow v. Brown, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972); Kennedy Park
Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
1010 (1971); cf. Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. City of Union
City, 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970) (disproportionate impact theory endorsed in dictum).
91 See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
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those interests. 92 Thus, under the first amendment, it is not suf-
ficient that a legislature has refrained from using an illegitimate
criterion of selection. The legislature must select and fine-tune
laws to avoid unnecessary intrusion on first amendment in-
terests. By contrast, under the traditional prohibition of equal
protection, it is sufficient that the legislature has refrained from
using race or its functional equivalent as a criterion of selection.
The legislature, in the course of enacting "neutral" laws, need
not affirmatively accommodate the interests of racial minorities.
Why is the first amendment the source of an affirmative as
well as a negative obligation, and the equal protection clause, as
traditionally conceived, the source of only a negative obligation?
The first amendment protects values and interests believed in-
dispensable to the democratic functioning of the political pro-
cess. 93 Government is charged with the duty, under the first
amendment, of safeguarding those values and interests-and
thus the democratic process-by acting solicitously toward them
as well as by refraining from deliberately abridging them. The
equal protection clause serves principally as a brake on the la-
mentable tendency of the majority race wilfully to oppress or
exploit racial minorities, and in this regard it prohibits, absent
compelling justification, the use of race as a criterion of selec-
tion. Traditionally, however, it has not been thought wrong-
unfortunate, perhaps, but not wrong-that an individual or
group is incidentally burdened by a law serving the public
good.94 Incidental burdens. have been thought the fair price
everyone, black as well as white, must pay, at some time or other,
for the societal advantages of laws. After all, virtually every piece
of legislation is burdensome to somebody. Accordingly, with re-
spect to racial discrimination equal protection doctrine has fo-
cused almost exclusively on wilfull oppression or exploitation
of minorities by the majority. This focus is especially under-
standable in light of what historically has been this society's
severest moral affliction, racial animus.
Under DRI theory a law is presumptively unconstitutional,
even though it employs no racial criterion of selection, if it has a
disproportionate racial impact. Correlatively, government has an
92 See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
93 See, e.g., Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1,
20-35 (1971).
9" Such a law, employing no racial criterion of selection and hence racially
"neutral," need have only a rational basis. See Washington v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 2040, 2051
(1976).
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obligation, an affirmative duty, to pursue its legitimate interests
by means of laws selected and fine-tuned for the purpose of
avoiding unnecessary intrusion on the interests of racial mi-
norities. DRI theory thus moves beyond the traditional prohi-
bition, the negative duty, of equal protection and imposes on
government an affirmative obligation akin to its affirmative ob-
ligation under the first amendment.
As indicated above,95 a law employing no racial criterion of
selection is constitutionally legitimate, according to traditional
equal protection theory, if it has a rational basis. This legitimacy
is premised on the notion that virtually every law disadvantages
somebody; that, as long as a law does not rest on an invidious
classification and has a rational basis, the consequent disadvan-
tage is ethically inoffensive. But this premise has limited force.
When the disadvantage is suffered not merely as a consequence
of a law, but also and more fundamentally as a consequence of
prior governmental action that was constitutionally (and ethically) offen-
sive, it cannot be maintained that the disadvantage is ethically
inoffensive. The disadvantage, in such a circumstance, is the
fruit of prior government misdeeds and, accordingly, should
bear a heavier burden of justification than that required of a
truly neutral disadvantage. But surely this is rather abstract.
Consider the point in the context of disadvantage disproportion-
ately visited on blacks by a racially neutral law.
The reason that some government actions disproportionately
disadvantage blacks stems from the social position of blacks in
American society. A greater proportion of blacks than whites are
poor and poorly educated. Blacks not only have been discrimi-
nated against in education, 96 but, because familial and social dis-
integration resulting from two centuries of slavery and discrimi-
nation have impeded the motivation and cognitive development
of many black children, many blacks also have been unable
to take optimal advantage of the inferior educations offered
them.9 7 Moreover, most blacks live in racially isolated environ-
ments that are deprived, if not devastated. A law having the
effect of burdening the poor or poorly educated or of reinforc-
ing racial isloation will have the further effect of disproportion-
ately disadvantaging blacks.
'5 See note 94 supra & accompanying text.
96See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971); Gaston County v.
United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969).
'7 See Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHi. L. REv. 235, 239 (1971).
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The underlying cause of disproportionate racial impact, the
especially disadvantaged social position of black Americans, is
one for which American society and government bear a heavy
moral responsibility. For well over two hundred years America
was a slave society, and, even after the abolition of slavery,
American society continued to perpetrate racial discrimination.
It simply will not suffice, when assessing moral responsibility, to in-
voke the metaphysical distinction between "private" discrimina-
tion and discrimination propagated by the state. The state is the
agent of society, and the state's failure to outlaw private dis-
crimination is simply society's conspiracy with itself to nurture
invidious discrimination. The failure of American society to out-
law racial discrimination-at least those instances of discrimina-
tion (in schooling, housing, and employment) most destructive to
the social position of blacks-was hardly better, as a moral mat-
ter, than the discrimination itself. In terms of moral responsi-
bility this failure, which endured for too long, amounted to
complicity. Laws having a disproportionate racial impact bur-
den blacks because of their especially disadvantaged position in
American society. A failure to require government to take ac-
count of that especially disadvantaged social position by selecting
and fine-tuning laws to avoid the unnecessary or thoughtless
aggravation of the situation would effectively ignore American
society's responsibility for that social position.9" Furthermore,
the failure would compound the responsibility. 99
9 S5ee id. 248-49 & n.17.
99 There are other reasons to incorporate DRI theory into equal protection analysis.
Laws having a disproportionate racial impact tend to inflict disadvantages not unlike
the disadvantages inflicted by laws employing a racial criterion of selection. In addition,
laws having a disproportionate racial impact are connected with the very same social
evils-supremacist ideology and racialism-that underlie laws employing a racial crite-
rion. The deliberate use of a racial criterion of selection, we noted earlier, text accom-
panying note 63 supra, typically has been part of an effort to disadvantage a racial
minority and to institutionalize white supremacist notions. Moreover, the deliberate use
of a racial criterion encourages racialism, the mental habit of thinking about and deal-
ing with individuals not as individuals but as members of a particular racial group.
These considerations underlie the presumptive invalidity of laws employing race as a
criterion of selection. To what extent do similar considerations suggest that laws em-
ploying no racial criterion but having a disproportionate racial impact should be subject
to a burden of justification heavier than mere rationality? By definition, such laws dis-
advantage blacks to a greater extent than whites. The degree of disadvantage is argu-
ably less when discriminatory purpose is absent, because a discriminatory purpose car-
ries with it a stigma of racial inferiority. But surely the disadvantage-for example,
failure to get a job because of a poor performance on a written examination-is serious
nonetheless. It might be asked: Isn't the disadvantage the same for a black person who
fails an employment test as for a white person who fails the same test? But the question
misses the point. The relevant perspective is less that of the disadvantaged individual
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Thus, DRI theory governs disadvantage disproportionately
suffered by a racial minority as a consequence of prior societal
discrimination against that minority. 100 The theory does not de-
cree, however, that all such disadvantages are unjustified. The
DRI standard of review is flexible. Laws employing a racial
criterion of selection are inherently more dangerous than laws
involving no racial criterion. The former, unlike the latter, di-
rectly encourage racialism.' 0 ' Moreover, laws employing a racial
criterion are usually difficult if not impossible to justify on
legitimate grounds. By contrast, laws having a disproportionate
racial impact are quite easy to explain on legitimate grounds
because such laws serve a legitimate function in addition to the
function of racial selection.'0 2 Accordingly, the standard of re-
view-the burden of justification-contemplated by DRI theory
is more rigorous than that required by the rational relationship
test but less rigorous than that required by the strict scrutiny
test.
The flexible standard of review is rooted in practical consid-
erations as well. It would be unreasonable to require that all
tainted disadvantages-disadvantages that are in part the conse-
than the perspective of the entire racial minority. The disproportionate character of the
disadvantage, because it constitutes a severe impediment to the racial minority in its
difficult struggle to escape the legacy of slavery and oppression and to achieve real
social equality, is especially burdensome.
Laws having a disproportionate racial impact but employing no racial criterion of
selection, unlike laws employing a racial criterion, are not inherently expressive of white
supremacist notions. Nonetheless, laws having a disproportionate impact aggravate the
already especially disadvantaged and isolated positions of blacks in American society,
and that social position of blacks reinforces supremacist notions of "inherent" white
superiority, a superiority thought to explain and to justify the privileged social position
of whites. Similarly, although racially "neutral" laws having a disproportionate impact
do not directly encourage racialism, they do-in aggravating the social position of black
Americans-exacerbate the racial inequality and antipathies that promote the habit of
thinking of individuals as "black" or "white." Acceptance of DRI theory, with its re-
quirement that laws having a disproportionate racial impact withstand a burden ofjus-
tification heavier than mere rationality, would reflect the fact that such laws tend to
inflict disadvantages and to reinforce social evils comparable to the disadvantages and
evils accompanying laws employing race as a criterion of selection.
100 Before a law is presumptively unconstitutional under DRI theory, therefore,
three factors must be present. First, the plaintiff must be a member of a-group that has
suffered from a history of discrimination and that is still suffering from that discrimina-
tion. Second, there must be government action that disproportionately affects the
group. And third, there must be some causal connection between the history of dis-
crimination and the disproportionate character of the impact. In most cases, however,
there will be little controversy over the presence of these factors. The crucial issue is
more likely to be whether the disproportion is greater than necessary to achieve the
governmental objective.
"I1 See note 62 supra.
102 See text accompanying notes 84-85 supra.
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quence of prior societal discrimination-be undone. Some laws
having a disproportionate racial impact may be reasonable ef-
forts to achieve a present social good. For example, a hiring
practice having a disproportionate racial impact may nonetheless
be job-related and hence necessary in order to screen out un-
qualified job applicants.
In determining whether a disproportionate disadvantage is
justified, a court would weigh several factors: (1) the degree of
disproportion in the impact;' 03 (2) the private interest disadvan-
taged; (3) the efficiency of the challenged law in achieving its
objective and the availability of alternative means having a less
disproportionate impact; and (4) the government objective
sought to be advanced. Consider, for example, a challenge to a
written examination used to screen applicants for public em-
ployment, as in Washington v. Davis. A showing of significant
disproportionate impact would require the employer to establish
that the examination does in fact accurately measure the precise
skills demanded by the specific job in question. If the examina-
tion could not be validated in this fashion, the employer would
have to design a more finely-tuned examination--one that
might or might not have a disproportionate impact but that,
even if it had the same impact as the challenged examination,
would pass muster under DRI theory if it were sufficiently job-
"'3 Or the degree of racial imbalance (in the classroom, or in the suburb and
nearby urban neighborhoods) caused or reinforced by the challenged action. Courts
have responded successfully to the "how disproportionate is disproportionate enough"
problem in applying the statutory disproportionate impact test of Title VII's fair em-
ployment provisions, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e-16 to 2000e-17 (Supp. V 1975), and there is no reason why they could not re-
spond just as successfully in applying a constitutional disproportionate impact test. See
Ely, supra note 28, at 1256-57:
[O]ne is surely entitled to ask "disproportionate as compared to what"--the
racial distribution in the nation, the state, or the surrounding area, however
that might be defined? And assuming that question can be answered, how dis-
proportionate is disproportionate enough?
• . . The fact that no standards push themselves forward for determining
the degree of disproportion which should be required to trigger intervention
cannot [count as a refutation of a disproportionate racial impact approach]
either. Were the Court to conclude that an affirmative requirement of "bal-
anced" impact would best serve the values underlying the guarantee of equal
protection, the chain of reasoning by which that conclusion was established
presumably would suggest guidelines which could be given specific content on
a case by case basis. Courts have proceeded thus in other legal contexts; there
is no reason to think they could not do so here.
Professor Ely subsequently argues against affirmative action theory in the jury selection
context, id. 1257-61, not against DRI theory. Ely.did not confuse the two, but he did
fail to distinguish them in developing arguments that have force only as applied to
affirmative action theory.
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related. In this example, the weights of the private interest dis-
advantaged, employment, and of the objective sought to be
advanced, securing competent employees, are both substantial,
and the job-relatedness requirement accommodates both inter-
ests.1
0 4
It is important not to confuse DRI theory with affirmative
action theory. The latter is considerably more problematic than
the former. Whereas affirmative action theory calls for govern-
ment to undo the effects of prior discrimination, DRI theory is
premised on the notion that government should not exacerbate
the effects of prior discrimination any more than is reasonably
necessary to achieve the governmental objective. Thus, DRI
theory, unlike affirmative action theory, does not call for the
allocation of scarce goods and resources to racial minorities with
the consequence that these scarce goods and resources are de-
nied to at least some nonminority persons. It requires only that
government, in certain contexts, not rely on laws or practices
having a disproportionate racial impact. A poor or poorly edu-
cated white benefits from the absence of laws disadvantaging
poor or poorly educated persons no less than a poor or poorly
educated black. Conversely, an affluent, highly educated black
person living in an integrated suburb gains nothing from the
absence of laws disadvantaging poor or poorly educated per,
sons.10 5 The laws preferred by DRI theory apply to blacks and
whites in exactly the same way. The laws favored by affirmative
action theory do not.
Io4 See text accompanying note 146 infra. An additional point merits mention. In a
society too long riven by slavery and even now not wholly exorcised of racism, the
possibility always exists that a law disproportionately disadvantaging blacks, while in-
volving no visible discriminatory purpose, will nonetheless have as its principal motive
a concealed desire to discriminate against blacks. See, e.g., Baker v. Columbus Mun.
Separate School Dist., 462 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1972); cf. Perry, Substantive Due Process
Revisited: Reflections on (and Beyond) Recent Cases, 71 Nw. U.L. REv. 417 (1976) (dis-
cussing Andrews v. Drew Mun. Separate School Dist., 371 F. Supp. 27 (N.D. Miss.
1973), aff'd, 507 F.2d 611 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 423 U.S. 820 (1975), cert. dismissed, 96
S. Ct. 1752 (1976)). DRI theory and the judicial function it contemplates speak to just
this possibility. In this society, with its sad history of racial oppression, those whose laws
or practices disproportionately disadvantage blacks should bear the burden of establish-
ing that such a law bears a substantial relation to its purported objective; that alterna-
tive routes to the same objective will not work nearly as well; and that the objective
outweighs the disadvantage disproportionately inflicted on blacks. Even this showing
does not guarantee that an invisible discriminatory purpose is not present, but it does
diminish that possibility.
"' Indeed, if tomorrow black Americans, as a class, miraculously achieved the exact
same level of economic well-being and educational attainment that upper middle class
white Americans now enjoy, the existence of laws enacted pursuant to an effort to avoid
burdening the poor or poorly educated or reinforcing racial isolation would not give
black Americans any advantage over white Americans.
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It has been suggested that a nonmotivational theory of racial
discrimination, in requiring government to accommodate the in-
terests of racial minorities, is color conscious and thus weakens
the effort of government to inculcate colorblindness in our
socio-political life.10 6 This objection, which is perhaps the most
telling argument against affirmative action, has a considerably
diminished force when directed at DRI theory. As just ex-
plained, DRI theory does not call for the allocation of scarce
resources to minority members on the basis of race. As we will
see below, DRI theory is applicable principally in three contexts:
employment, land use planning, and education. The impact of
DRI theory on public employment is not to require "quotas," but
only to require hiring practices that are validated as job-related.
The impact of DRI theory on land use policy is, again, not to
require quotas, but only to require the disestablishment of cer-
tain land use barriers to the construction of low income housing.
Thus, with respect to employment and land use planning DRI
theory does not entail color consciousness in either the terms or
administration of official policy.
The impact of DRI theory on educational policy is to re-
quire that student assignment and other administrative decisions
be designed, where practicable, to avoid racially imbalanced
schools. In this sense, student assignment decisions would be
color conscious, but it is difficult to avoid racial isolation in the
classrooms without taking note officially of what is known unof-
ficially anyway: the racial identity of the neighborhoods. Thus,
DRI theory does not contribute substantially to color conscious-
ness in any of the three contexts in which it will be most
applicable.'
0 7
106 See note 62 supra.
107 DRI theory would be applicable to site selection policies of public housing au-
thorities by requiring housing officials, in their selection of sites, to avoid reinforcing
residential racial imbalance. This requirement, like the requirement that school officials
act, when practical, to avoid creating racially imbalanced classrooms, does entail color
consciousness. But, again, that consciousness-an awareness of the racial identity of
neighborhoods--exists anyway. Moreover, federal statutory law already requires that
site selection policies be designed to improve residential racial balance. See Housing and
Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437(a), (f), 5301-5317 (Supp. IV
1974). The federal regulations on site selection for HUD projects also require an
awareness of the racial composition of the area. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 880.112(d), .203(b),
883.209(a) (1976). For a discussion of the effect of federal law in this area, see Hills v.
Gautreaux, 96 S. Ct. 1538, 1548-50 (1976).
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V. THE FLEXIBILITY AND CONTEXTUALLY LIMITED CHARACTER
OF DISPROPORTIONATE RACIAL IMPACT THEORY
In rejecting the disproportionate impact theory of racial dis-
crimination in Washington v. Davis, the Supreme Court failed to
comprehend two important features of the theory: the flexibility
of its standard of review and its contextually limited character.
The Court seemed to assume, mistakenly, that the strictest
scrutiny, with its requirement of compelling justification, would
be demanded by disproportionate impact theory. 108 Further-
more, whereas a claim based on discriminatory purpose-the
deliberate use by government of race or its functional equivalent
as a criterion of selection-can exist in any context and render
any government action presumptively unconstitutional, a claim
based on disproportionate racial impact, as a practical matter,
can exist in only a limited number of contexts and can succeed in
even fewer. 10 9
A. The Flexibility of DRI Theory
In rejecting DRI theory, the Washington Court expressed
concern that acceptance and application of the theory might re-
sult in the invalidation of government-imposed fees, priorities in
the distribution of scarce welfare monies, and minimum wage
and usury legislation. Such legislation, suggested the Court,
"may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average black
than to the more affluent white.""10 Further reflection could
have dispelled the Court's concern. Under DRI theory, the bare
fact of disproportionate impact has limited significance. The fact
of disproportionate impact does no more than trigger applica-
tion of the disproportionate impact standard of review. At this
point factors other than disproportionate impact become crucial,
principally the private interest, in relation to which there is a
disproportionate impact, and the public interest, the pursuit of
which by means of the challenged law or practice has a dispro-
portionate impact.
""8 See 96 S. Ct. at 2051-52.
109 It should be clear now why DRI theory does not simply displace the motiva-
tional theory of racial discrimination. First, DRI theory is contextually limited. Second,
the DRI standard of review is more flexible and less strict than the standard governing
laws employing a racial criterion of selection.
110 96 S. Ct. at 2051-52 & n.14.
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Consider the suggestion that application of DRI theory
might result in the invalidation of government-imposed fees for
goods and services. Obviously the government's interest in a quid
pro quo is substantial. The public fisc is not inexhaustible. An
individual's interest in receiving, for nothing or at reduced cost,
goods or services that carry a price tag is not usually recognized
as legitimate. Certainly, it is not substantial."' There is an excep-
tion with respect to particular commodities, such as a criminal
trial transcripts, which are deemed indispensable to the preser-
vation of fundamental values. 112 Existing constitutional doctrine,
however, already deals with such exigencies." 3 DRI theory
would not invalidate government fees for goods and services
except in those rare instances in which existing constitutional
doctrine already would dictate the same result.
Consider next the suggestion that DRI theory might invali-
date legislatively determined priorities in the distribution of
scarce welfare monies. In Jefferson v. Hackney, 1 4 cited by the
Court in Washington in rejecting disproportionate impact
theory," 5 recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) challenged on equal protection grounds a Texas welfare
program under which recipients of Old Age Assistance (OAA)
were funded at 100% of established need, recipients of Aid to
the Blind and Disabled (ABD) were funded at 95%, and AFDC
recipients at only 75%. The plaintiffs argued that because ra-
cial minorities were disproportionately represented among the
AFDC class, funding OAA and ABD recipients at a higher per-
centage of need than AFDC recipients disproportionately disad-
vantaged racial minorities. The Court in Jefferson rejected plain-
tiffs' nonmotivational theory of racial discrimination," 6 but even
if the Court had embraced and applied DRI theory the result
would have been the same.
Although the AFDC recipients' interest in receiving addi-
tional welfare monies is certainly not insignificant, the public's
111 Cf. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the Poor
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7, 28 (1969) ("We usually regard it
as both the fairest and most efficient arrangement to require each consumer to pay the
full market price of what he consumes, limiting his consumption to what his income
permits.")
"' See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
113 See, e.g., Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40, 42 (1967); Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353, 355-58 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
114 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
115 96 S. Ct. at 2048.
116 406 U.S. at 548-49.
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interest in allocating its scarce welfare resources as it sees fit is
quite substantial. The familiar principle that a state may attack
only a part of a problem and is not required to attack the whole
problem 1 7 has particular force when the state is allocating wel-
fare monies."18 Moreover, there is nothing inherently suspicious
about a state's decision to favor, as a matter of social policy, a
"natural" class, such as indigent old people, that includes mem-
bers of racial minorities. 119 In Jefferson, the equities were clearly
with the state, and the state's interest plainly outweighed the
interest of the AFDC recipients.
120
Consider finally the suggestion that application of DRI
theory might invalidate minimum wage and usury laws. 12 ' The
premise of this suggestion is that such laws do more harm than
good for poor people-and thus to blacks who are dispropor-
tionately represented among the poor-by diminishing the total
number of menial jobs available and by preventing poor people
from getting loans. That, however, is a complex economic judg-
ment of precisely the sort that courts, at least since the 1930s,
have been loath to make.' 22 Unless a court is prepared to pre-
sume, contrary to the implicit legislative judgment, that
minimum wage and usury laws disadvantage the poor, the pre-
sumption must be that such legislation benefits the poor. Given
that presumption, grounded in traditional and appropriate judi-
cial deference to legislative judgments respecting complex eco-
117 See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
118 See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970): "[T]he intractable eco-
nomic, social, and even philosophical problems presented by public welfare assistance
programs are not the business of this Court. ... IT]he Constitution does not empower
this Court to second-guess state officials charged with the difficult responsibility of al-
locating limited public welfare funds among the myriad of potential recipients."
119 See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 548 & n.17 (1972) (statistics showing
that "the number of minority members in all [welfare] categories is substantial").
120 A contrary conclusion would necessarily entail the proposition that the state
could not have a welfare program for old people alone. If the state has discretion to
provide welfare for the aged without incurring an obligation to provide welfare for
other needy classes, as surely it does, a fortiori it may provide greater welfare benefits
for the aged than for a distinct group funded at a diminished level of need-at least it
may as a constitutional- matter. In Jefferson, the dissent contended that Congress, by
statute, had provided that once a state participates in a federally-funded welfare pro-
gram (e.g., AFDC), it must participate on the same basis that it participates in every
other federally-funded welfare program (e.g., OAA and ABD). Id. at 577-82 (Marshall,
J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting).
121 The Washington Court cited, in this regard, Silverman, Equal Protection, Economic
Legislation, and Racial Discrimination, 25 VAND. L. REv. 1183 (1972). 96 S. Ct. at 2052
n.14.
122 See Perry, Substantive Due Process Revisited: Reflections on (and Beyond) Recent Cases,
71 Nw. U.L. REv. 417 (1976).
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nomic matters, there is no disadvantage to the poor and there-
fore no occasion for application of DRI theory.
The Supreme Court, in suggesting that application of DRI
theory might invalidate government-imposed fees, priorities in
the distribution of scarce welfare resources, and minimum wage
and usury laws, failed to consider the intrinsic sensitivity of the
DRI standard of review to the character of the interests at stake.
The flexibility of DRI review precludes the "parade of horribles"
that the Court feared would accompany application of DRI
theory.
B. Contexts in Which DRI Theory Is Not Applicable
1. Jury Selection
The Washington Court, in rejecting DRI theory, cited cases
holding that a criminal defendant must prove an intent or pur-
pose to discriminate to make out a claim of racial discrimination
in jury selection.' 2 3 "[T]he fact that a particular jury or series of
juries does not statistically reflect the racial composition of the
community does not in itself make out an invidious discrimina-
tion forbidden by the [Equal Protection] Clause."' 24 The jury
selection cases cited by the Court are largely irrelevant to the
public employment context of Washington. That DRI theory is
inapplicable in a particular context does not establish its inap-
plicability in every context. The Court's citation of the jury se-
lection cases as authority for rejecting DRI theory in the context
of public employment demonstrates the Court's failure to un-
derstand the contextually limited character of DRI theory.
There are three stages in the jury selection process at which
racial discrimination can occur. The first is the establishment, by
statute, of qualifications for jurors. Of course, statutes setting
qualifications for jurors must not employ race as a criterion of
selection.' 25 Beyond that, statutes establishing qualifications must
recognize that the selection of a jury "from a representative cross
123 96 S. Ct. at 2047.
124 ld.
25 See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879). The Supreme Court
has suggested that even voluntary affirmative action in jury selection, an effort by the
state to insure proportional representation of racial minorities on juries, is unconstitu-
tional. See Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 286-87 (1950) (plurality opinion by Reed, J.).
There is reason to doubt that Cassell "represents [the Court's] last word, or necessarily
even its present thinking, on the permissibility of such attempts in the jury context." Ely,
supra note 28, at 1259 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
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section of the community is an essential component of the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial. ' 126 Qualifications that would
have a disproportionate racial impact would offend the sixth
amendment. Consequently, there is simply no occasion for appli-
cation of DRI theory to statutes setting qualifications for jurors.
The second stage at which racial discrimination can occur is
the compilation of eligibility lists pursuant to the statutory qual-
ifications. Given qualifications that comport with the sixth
amendment, there is no reason why compilation of an eligibility
list should have a disproportionate racial impact. If, at this ad-
ministrative stage, a disproportionate number of blacks are ex-
cluded, the inescapable inference is that a discriminatory pur-
pose is operating. 127 Again, there is no occasion for application
of DRI theory.
The final stage at which racial discrimination can occur is
the selection of general venires from an eligibility list, or the
selection of particular panels from general venires. When the
selection process is nonrandom, no reason exists-given qualifi-
cations that comport with the sixth amendment and eligibility
lists free from the taint of discriminatory purpose-for the selec-
tion process to have a disproportionate racial impact. If a non-
126 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975). The qualifications set within this
constitutional framework are fairly standard: "Nearly every State requires that its jurors
be citizens of the United States, residents of the locality, of a specified minimum age,
and able to understand English. Many of the States require that jurors be of 'good
character' or the like; some, that they be 'intelligent' or 'well informed.'" Carter v. Jury
Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 333 (1970) (footnotes, containing compilation of statutes, omit-
ted).
127 See, e.g., Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 361 (1970). It is possible that at this
stage of jury selection jury commissioners will compile lists of eligible jurors by includ-
ing only those qualified individuals known to them personally or through acquain-
tances, club membership lists, or the like. In that case the commissioners have created a
de facto qualification: in order for an otherwise qualified individual to be ajuror, ajury
commissioner must know him personally or through specific channels. A commissioner
proceeding in this fashion has a constitutional duty, under the sixth amendment's "fair
cross section" requirement, to acquaint himself with qualified individuals from all seg-
ments of the community. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 207 n.4 (1965).
Significantly, prior to the emergence of the sixth amendments "fair cross section"
requirement in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), the Supreme Court had held:
"Where jury commissioners limit those from whom grand juries are selected to their
own personal acquaintance, discrimination can arise from commissioners who know no
negroes as well as from commissioners who know but eliminate them. If there has been
discrimination, whether accomplished ingeniously or ingenuously, the conviction cannot
stand." Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 132 (1940). This statement reflects an application
of DRI theory to a claim of racial discrimination in jury selection-an application doubt-
less motivated by the Court's suspicion that discriminatory purpose might be present
even though, as an evidentiary matter, invisible and thus not available as a ground of
decision.
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random selection process somehow excludes blacks, the infer-
ence is inescapable that a discriminatory purpose is the cause.
Once again, there is no occasion for application of DRI theory.
The selection of a general venire or a particular grand jury
panel may be random, and the selection of a particular petit jury
panel, except for peremptory challenges" 8 and challenges for
cause, is usually random. Selection that is authentically random-
again, given qualifications that comport with the sixth amend-
ment and eligibility lists free from the taint of discriminatory
purpose-cannot have a disproportionate racial impact.
129 If
blacks are somehow excluded in the purportedly "random"
process of selecting juries, the inference is inescapable that the
process was not random and, moreover, was infected with a dis-
criminatory purpose. 130 As before, there is no occasion for appli-
cation of DRI theory.
Thus, DRI theory is inapplicable in the context of jury
selection.' 3 ' The Court's citation of the jury selection cases as
authority for rejecting DRI theory in the context of public em-
ployment demonstrates the Court's failure to understand that
the jury selection context is quite unlike the public employment
context and others in which government actions truly lacking a
discriminatory purpose can have a disproportionate racial im-
pact nonetheless.
2. Legislative Districting
As further authority for rejecting DRI theory, the Wash-
128 Peremptory challenges present a special problem. See Swain v. Alabama, 380
U.S. 202, 209-28 (1965); United States v. Carter, 528 F.2d 844, 847-50 (8th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1745 (1976).
129 Of course, random selection will not result in the proportional representation of
racial minorities on each and every jury panel selected, but over the long run authentic
random selection will result in proportional representation.
130 See, e.g., Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953).
131 The suggestion that racial minorities are entitled to proportional representation
on individual jury panels, consistently rejected by the Supreme Court, see, e.g., Akins v.
Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1945), proceeds from affirmative action theory. The sug-
gestion is in no way supported by DRI theory. The language of the Supreme Court in
Akins, quoted by the Court in Washington, 96 S. Ct. at 2047, holding that a discrimina-
tory purpose must be shown to substantiate a claim of racial discrimination in jury
selection, was directed not against DRI theory, but against the affirmative action notion
that racial minorities are constitutionally entitled to proportional representation on in-
dividual juries. See Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. at 403. There is a fundamental difference
between a requirement that a law not have a disproportionate racial impact absent ade-
quate justification and a requirement that a law employ a racial criterion of selection in
order to achieve proportionality. DRI theory requires only the former; affirmative ac-
tion theory requires the latter. See note 103 & text accompanying notes 104-05 supra.
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ington Court cited Wright v. Rockefeller,132 which, as the Court
described,
upheld a New York congressional apportionment stat-
ute against claims that district lines had been racially
gerrymandered. The challenged districts were made up
predominantly of whites or of minority races, and their
boundaries were irregularly drawn. The challengers did
not prevail because they failed to prove that the New
York legislature "was either motivated by racial consid-
erations or in fact drew the districts on racial lines"; the
plaintiffs had not shown that the statute "was the prod-
uct of a state contrivance to segregate on the basis of
race or place of origin." . . . The dissenters were in
agreement that the issue was whether the "boundaries
... were purposefully drawn on racial lines."'133
The Court's citation of Wright, like its citation of the jury selec-
tion cases, was inappropriate; it failed to explore the differences
between the legislative districting context and the context in
issue, public employment.
Claims that a legislative districting scheme is racially dis-
criminatory usually allege either racial gerrymandering 13 4 or the
discriminatory operation of a multimember district in which rep-
resentatives are elected on an "at large" basis.' 35 In either case,
the basic complaint is that the districting scheme minimizes the
political power of the complaining racial minority.' 3 6 But, al-
132 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
133 96 S. Ct. at 2047-48 (quoting Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 56, 58 (1964))
(citations omitted).
M3' See, e.g., Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
31 See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-70 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis,
403 U.S. 124 (1971).
136 A districting scheme may be designed to maximize the political power of a racial
minority, and a complainant who is not a member of the racial minority may contend
that his group's power has been minimized impermissibly. "Benign" racial gerrymander-
ing can be a two-edged sword even with respect to the minority that was the intended
beneficiary. While the affected racial minority gains in the way of political clout in one
district, it may lose what political influence it had in others. Cf Wright v. Rockefeller,
376 U.S. 52, 57-58 (1964) (voters disagree on desirability of distributing minority
groups among districts). Benign racial districting by the New York legislature was re-
cently upheld in the face of a constitutional challenge in United Jewish Organizations of
Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Wilson, 510 F.2d 512 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub noma. United Jewish
Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 96 S. Ct. 354 (1975). See Note, Proportion-
al Representation by Race: The Constitutionality of Benign Racial Redistricting, 74 MIcH. L.
Rv. 820 (1976); cf. Bittker, The Case of the Checker-Board Ordinance: An Experiment in Race
Relations, 71 YALE L.J. 1387, 1414-15 (1962) (racial minorities are not entitled to pro-
portional representation).
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though a multimember scheme, 137 for example, disadvantages
blacks to the extent that it minimizes their voting power, this
disadvantage is not a consequence of the history of discrimi-
nation to which blacks have been subject.1 38 A multimember
scheme does not disadvantage blacks because they, as a group,
are poor, poorly educated, or racially isolated. Rather, it disad-
vantages them only because they are a minority group. The
status of black people as a minority group is not the legacy of
slavery or discrimination. Blacks are one minority group among
many: some groups are racially defined, others are defined by a
common interest or concern. In being disadvantaged as a politi-
cal interest group, blacks are affected in the same way as any
other interest group tending to congregate in a common neigh-
borhood (such as poor people, apartment dwellers, and shop-
keepers). 139 All such groups would stand a better chance of
electing someone sympathetic to their special interests if their
electoral jurisdiction were a smaller, single-member unit. The
principle is the same if the issue is not multi- versus single-mem-
ber districts, but district line-drawing, "gerrymandering."
Of course, blacks are much more likely than nonracial
minority groups to suffer from a multimember scheme, because
blacks have been and remain the victims of virulent discrimina-
tion. If a court finds that a multimember scheme is used by local
political actors or by the voting citizenry as a vehicle of racial
discrimination, it may disestablish the vehicle of discrimination,
the multimember district. 140 The rationale for striking down
such a multimember scheme is that it, as a vehicle of intentional
137 Most claims of racially discriminatory districting are directed against mul-
timember districts. See, e.g., cases cited note 135 supra; Dove v. Moore, 45 U.S.L.W.
2064 (8th Cir. July 27, 1976); McGill v. Gadsden County Comm'n, 535 F.2d 277 (5th
Cir. 1976); Nevett v. Sides, 533 F.2d 1361 (5th Cir. 1976); Kendrick v. Walder, 527
F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1975); Blacks United for Lasting Leadership, Inc. v. Shreveport, 45
U.S.L.W. 2052 (W.D. La. July 16, 1976).
138 See note 100 supra.
139 That blacks, like other minority political interest groups, do not invariably enjoy
success at the polls, does not in itself present a constitutional problem. See Whitcomb v.
Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 153 (1971). Moreover, the Supreme Court has consistently re-
jected the affirmative action notion, see note 131 supra, that racial minorities-or
minorities of any kind-are constitutionally entitled to proportional representation by
members of their own race and, therefore, to districting schemes that guarantee such
representation. See Beer v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 1357, 1361 n.8 (1976); Whitcomb v.
Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1971); Kilgarlin v. Martin, 252 F. Supp. 404, 432-33 (S.D.
Tex. 1966), rev'd per curiam on other grounds sub nom. Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120
(1967). See also Panior v. Iberville Parish School Bd., 536 F.2d 101, 104 (5th Cir. 1976);
cases cited in Note, supra note 136, at 824 n.26.
14 See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-70 (1973).
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racial discrimination, is infected with discriminatory purpose. 141
Thus, DRI theory is not applicable to legislative districting
schemes. When operating without the taint of discriminatory
purpose, a districting scheme disadvantages blacks, if at all, in
essentially the same way it disadvantages other minority interest
groups in the political process. When operating as a vehicle of
racial discrimination-and in that sense disadvantaging blacks in
a way other groups are not disadvantaged, deliberately, on the
basis of race-a districting scheme is infected with discrimina-
tory purpose and can, on that motivational ground, be struck
down.
142
C. Contexts in Which DRI Theory Is Applicable
1. Public Employment
Hiring and promotion practices similar to the written ex-
amination at issue in Washington or the requirement of a high
school diploma 43 place a premium on educational achievement
and thus impose a burden on those whose educational attain-
"" The Supreme Court and lower federal courts, most notably the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit, have endeavored to isolate those factors that, if proved, will
sustain a conclusion that a multimember district has been used as a vehicle of racial
discrimination. See, e.g., id. at 766-67; Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th
Cir. 1973), aff'd per curiam sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 96 S. Ct.
1083 (1976). Although White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), is the only case in which
the Supreme Court has ruled against multimember schemes, the Court has advised the
lower federal courts that, in devising reapportionment plans, it should favor single-
member districts as a matter of policy. Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1 (1975). This
recommendation is somewhat ironic because multimember districts were once viewed as
progressive reform measures serving the interests of good government rather than
parochialism. See Kendrick v. Walder, 527 F.2d 44, 51 (7th Cir. 1975) (Pell, J., dissent-
ing) (citing relevant historical materials).
142 There are, of course, contexts besides jury selection and legislative districting in
which DRI theory is inapplicable. Consider, for example, criminal law enforcement.
Police and prosecutors are expected to attack crime where they find it and to fall to
attack it only for legitimate policy reasons. If in a certain community a disproportionate
number of blacks violate a particular law, or violate it more visibly than others, the fact
that enforcement of the law results in the prosecution of a disproportionate number of
blacks presents no constitutional problem. Criminal law enforcement, even selective
prosecution, offends equal protection only when an illegitimate criterion of selec-
tion-for example, race, religion, or political beliefs--is employed. Note, for example,
that concentrating undercover agents in a black neighborhood where most heroin
transactions are known to occur does not involve the use of race as a criterion of selec-
tion. The criterion is the volume of illicit transactions occurring. See, e.g., Oyler v. Boles,
368 U.S. 448 (1962); cf. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944) (absent discriminatory
motive, electoral body did not deny plaintiff equal protection by refusing to certify him
as nominee for state office). See generally Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 840-58 (4th ed. 1974).
143 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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ment, in the form of either intellectual or vocational skills, is
comparatively weak. Blacks are disproportionately represented
among those whose educational achievement is weak, and this
condition is part of the legacy of slavery and racial oppression.
Not only have blacks been discriminated against in education,
but the impact of slavery and discrimination on the family and
social structures of many blacks has seriously impaired the mo-
tivation and ability of many black children to succeed in the
classroom. Because there is a disproportionate impact, a history
of discrimination, and a causal connection between them, the
DRI standard of review should apply.
144
An individual's interest in having a job, and as good a job
as possible, is certainly very great. Employment is essential to
material well-being and basic emotional satisfaction; as such,
the right to work may be even more precious than the right to
vote. 1 45 An employer's interest in hiring only those qualified to
do the job, or those most qualified, is also great, and this be-
comes a societal interest when the employer is a government
agency.' 46 The requirement that a hiring practice bear a demon-
strable relation to job performance accommodates both interests.
Specifically, the requirement assures that the impact will not
be more disproportionate than necessary to secure the govern-
ment's interest in qualified employees. The decision not to apply
DRI theory to hiring practices like that challenged in Washington
implies-given the lenient demands of minimal scrutiny' 47-that
it is legitimate, as a constitutional matter, for government to
144 See note 100 supra. Employment is also important to the minority group to
which the individual belongs because that group can fully overcome the history of dis-
crimination only as its members acheive economic well-being.
145 See Fiss, supra note 97, at 294.
146 DRI theory also would apply to procedures whereby government certifies per-
sons to practice a given profession. Title VII does not govern such certification proce-
dures. Courts have disagreed on the propriety of applying DRI theory in this context.
Compare Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied. 44 U.S.L.W. 3719
(U.S. June 15, 1976) (rejecting a disproportionate impact challenge to the Georgia bar
examination, which all 40 black applicants failed in July 1972; applying rational rela-
tionship test), and Richardson v. McFadden, 45 U.S.L.W. 2130 (4th Cir. Aug. 14, 1976)
(rejecting disproportionate impact challenge to the South Carolina bar examnation;
"fair and substantial" job-relatedness required), with Baker v. Columbus Mun. Separate
School Dist., 462 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1972) (sustaining a challenge to use of the Na-
tional Teachers Examination as a condition of employment; strict scrutiny test applied),
Walston v. County School Bd., 492 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1973) (sustaining a dispropor-
tionate impact challenge to use of the National Teachers Examination; applying job-
relatedness requirement), and United States v. North Carolina, 400 F. Supp. 343
(E.D.N.C. 1975) (sustaining a disproportionate impact challenge to use of National
Teachers Examination; applying job-relatedness test).
147 See Washington v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 2040, 2051-52 (1976).
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employ a device that excludes a disproportionate number of
blacks even though it fails to bear a demonstrable relation to job
performance and thus fails to advance effectively government's
interest in employing qualified workers. 148 It is difficult to dis-
cern any justification for this proposition.
49
14' Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 20O0e-200e-15 (1970),
as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-16 to 2000e-17 (Supp. V 1975), did not apply to public
employment until 1972. The plaintiff in Washington did not rely on Title VII, because
the suit was commenced before passage of the public employment amendments, and
the procedural prerequisites for a Title VII action were never satisfied. The original
provisions of Title VII were enacted pursuant to Congress' commerce power. Fitzpa-
trick v. Bitzer, 96 S. Ct. 2666, 2670 (1976). The public employment amendments were
enacted pursuant to Congress' power under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment to en-
force the provisions of § 1 of that amendment. Id. at 2670 & n.9.
Unless the normative content of the equal protection clause is one thing when
Congress is enforcing the clause and something else when the Court is enforcing it, it is
impossible to understand how fourteenth amendment enforcement legislation (Title
VII public employment provisions) can rest on a nonmotivational theory of racial dis-
crimination when the very clause being enforced, as the Court in Washington construed
it, excludes such a theory. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 205-09 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 248 (Brennan, White & Marshall, JJ.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 293-96 (Stewart, J., joined by Burger,
C.J. & Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), establishes that the
normative content of a constitutional provision is the same for both Congress and the
Court. Given Oregon v. Mitchell, Washington's rejection of DRI theory is logically inconsis-
tent with the proposition that Congress, by way of enforcing the equal protection
clause, may forbid the states to use any hiring practice having a disproportionate racial
impact that does not bear a demonstrable relation to job performance. Only one of the
two theories-Washington or the proposition just cited-can prevail, for the two are
mutually exclusive. Because the latter is firmly established, the Court, unless it meant to
overrule sub silentio Oregon v. Mitchell, was simply wrong in Washington in suggesting
that the disproportionate impact theory of racial discrimination is somehow alien to the
concept of equal protection. The concept of equal protection, properly understood-the
way Congress understood it in extending Title VII to employment by the states--
addresses both motivational and nonmotivational modes of racial discrimination.
149 See Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167, 1175-76 (2d Cir. 1972) (con-
cerning public employment): "That harsh racial impact, even if unintended, amounts to
an invidious defacto classification that cannot be ignored or answered with a shrug. At
the very least, the Constitution requires that state action spawning such a classification
'be justified by legitimate state considerations.'" It is especially difficult to justify the
proposition in the text given the fact that a hiring practice having a disproportionate
impact impedes blacks, who suffer unemployment and menial employment more ex-
tensively than other groups, in their struggle to escape the legacy of discrimination.
See Blacks-On a New Plateau, NEWSWEER, Oct. 4, 1976, at 73.
In May 1975, total black joblessness was 14.2 per cent; by August /1976/, it had
come down only to 13.6 per cent. During the same period, over-all white un-
employment fell far faster, from 8.3 per cent to 7.1 per cent.
What's more, the statistics understate the actual extent of the damage,
many labor-market analysts contend. In many black households, for instance,
men have worked at two jobs just to make ends meet. "When the recession hit,
a lot of those second jobs were lost but the man was still not counted as unem-
ployed," says Aaron Turpeau, director of a U.S. Labor Department office in
Atlanta. When other anomalies are added to the official jobless estimates, the
rate mushrooms. According to its "hidden unemployment index," which takes
1977]
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 125:540
2. Administration of Public Schools15 0
Racial imbalance in the classroom reflects the residential ra-
cial isolation that pervades our society. This racial isolation is
perhaps the most significant consequence of slavery and racial
discrimination.15 ' Ghettoization-residential apartheid-is prob-
ably the surest sign of a society in which the color of a man's skin
has not ceased to matter. The presumptive invalidity of race as a
criterion of selection, as noted above, 5 2 is premised on the ex-
tent to which racial criteria directly disadvantage blacks, in-
stitutionalize supremacist ideology, and encourage racialism. Re-
sidential racial isolation disadvantages blacks by reinforcing
economic deprivation and by inflicting severe socio-psychological
dysfunction. Furthermore, by keeping the races separated and
imposing inequalities of material wealth and social skills on the
minority race, residential racial isolation facilitates the cultural
transmission of supremacist ideology and racialism. Racial isola-
tion, then, whether or not a direct consequence of intentional
discrimination, is a prolific source of disadvantage to blacks.
Although it is possible to do something about intentional
discrimination, it is virtually impossible to do anything about
residential racial isolation that is not the direct result of inten-
tional discrimination-impossible, at any rate, to do very much
in the short run, and impossible even in the long run without
both a societal consensus that something ought to be done and
concerted social engineering on several fronts. Even though it is
virtually impossible substantially to reduce residential racial isola-
tion in the foreseeable future, it is possible to moderate its ad-
verse impact.
Consider the administration of public schools. Because of
residential racial isolation, decisions as to pupil assignment,
account of discouraged and part-time workers who want full-time jobs, the Na-
tional Urban League calculates that the over-all rate for blacks in the second
quarter /1976/ was actually 25.4 per cent. For black teenagers, the rate hit a
staggering 64 per cent vs. the official count of 40 per cent.
Id. 74-79.
150 See generally Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts,
78 HARV. L. REv. 564 (1965); Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and
Empirical Analysis, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 275 (1972).
"5 Past discrimination has contributed to present residential racial isolation in at
least two important ways. First, discrimination is a major cause of the especially disad-
vantaged economic status of blacks that forces them into the most deprived neighbor-
hoods. Second, pervasive discrimination in housing underlies segregated neighbor-
hoods.
... See text accompanying note 57 supra.
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school site selection, and districting must have the effect of
either increasing or decreasing racial imbalance in the classroom.
In a quantitative sense, racial imbalance in the classroom does
not have a disproportionate racial impact. If there were two
schools, one 100% black and the other 100% white, there would
be perfect imbalance. To the extent that every black and every
white student would be racially isolated, however, the quantita-
tive impact of the imbalance would not be disproportionate. But
in a qualitative sense, racial imbalance does have a dispropor-
tionate impact: it disadvantages the isolated blacks much more
grievously than the isolated whites. Research into the effects of
racially imbalanced schooling on the educational achievement of
minority children is inconclusive. 153 On one important point,
however, a consensus exists: Racial isolation in the schools, like
racial isolation in the neighborhoods, facilitates the cultural
transmission of stereotyped, supremacist, racialist habits of
mind, and these habits nurture yet another generation of racial
discrimination, division, and hostility.' 5 4 Blacks are indisputably
the principal victims of this discrimination and hostility.
155
Just as something can be done, and is done, under the four-
teenth amendment, about racial criteria of selection and atten-
dant evils, something can be done about racial isolation in the
classroom. Racially imbalanced schools are sometimes inevitable,
but not always, and not everywhere. School administrators can
be charted with the duty of avoiding, to the extent practical,
racially imbalanced schools. School officials should be obligated
to consider the potential racial effects of alternative courses of
action and inaction, 156 and, where practical, to choose a course
15aSee Goodman, supra note 150, at 400-35. In August 1976, however, the United
States Civil Rights Commission issued a report suggesting "that peaceful desegregation
raises educational quality and minority achievement." See Rights Panel is Critical of Ford
on Schools, N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1976, § 4, at 4, col. 1. Certainly, social scientific re-
search is a problematic basis for constitutional decisionmaking. See Linde,Judges, Critics,
and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227, 238-44 (1972).
1 4 See, e.g., Hart v. Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699, 729-32 (E.D.N.Y.
1974), aff'd, 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 419,
504-05 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 109-10
(1967); Emerson, Frank, Frey, Griswold, Hale, Havighurst & Levi, Segregation and the
Equal Protection Clause, 34 MINN. L. REV. 289, 319-20 (1950); Goodman, supra note 150,
at 366.
155 This is not to say that whites are unaffected by the tensions, inefficiencies, and
inhumanities resulting from racial discrimination.
156See, e.g., Hart v. Community School Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37, 50 (2d Cir.
1975); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580, 585 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963
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that will minimize racial imbalance. Application to school ad-
ministration of the disproportionate impact theory of racial dis-
crimination would charge school officials with this obligation.
More specifically, application of DRI theory would subject
school officials to the requirement that action conducive to racial
balance be preferred if practical under the circumstances.
157
This requirement, obviously, would have to be applied with sen-
sitivity to local detail (and to sham assertions of impracticality).
The necessity for sensitive, case by case adjudication is not new
and hardly counts as a reason to reject DRI theory.' 58
It has been suggested that judicial reluctance to apply DRI
theory to school administration 159 stems from the fear that ap-
plication of the theory would necessitate unrealistic and unpopu-
lar remedial action such as massive busing.' 60 Again, however, it
is important to keep DRI theory and affirmative action notions
distinct. DRI theory does not imply a substantive constitutional
right to a particular degree of racial mixture in every public
school. The Supreme Court has correctly rejected the notion
that any such right exists.1 61 Rather, DRI theory contemplates
(1975). But cf. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 96 S. Ct. 2697, 2704-05 (1976)
(the district court exceeded its authority in requiring annual readjustment of attendance
zones once a neutral attendance plan had been implemented).
157 See Fiss, supra note 150, at 608:
For example, assume that the racial imbalance in a small urban community can
be corrected merely by replacing the attendance lines that run north-south
with others that run east-west, or by instituting an open transfer plan, or by
locating a new school on the fringe of the ghetto. In such a case a court...
[may] conclude that the board's refusal to adopt remedial measures is unjus-
tified.
For a discussion of a variety of mechanisms sometimes available for improving racial
balance, see id. 571-74 (open transfer plans; strategic site selection; rezoning without
sacrificing geographical compactness; enlargement of attendance zones; busing).
1"' See id. 608 (footnote omitted):
The possibility that a justification may exist prevents courts from making blan-
ket pronouncements that the creation and maintenance of imbalanced schools
always violates the equal-educational-opportunity principle.
Since constitutional adjudication demands uniformity, it may appear dis-
turbing that the creation and maintenance of imbalanced schools will violate
the equal-educational-opportunity principle only in some communities and in
some circumstances. Yet, uniformity is required only in the principle applied,
not in the outcome of this application. It is fallacious to assume that either all
instances of racial imbalance must be unconstitutional or none are, and this
fallacy is nourished by continued use of the term de facto segregation. This
term incorrectly suggests that the problem is one involving a monolithic institu-
tion, the Northern counterpart of the Jim Crow laws condemned in Brown.
'5 Most courts have not been so reluctant. See note 88 supra.
160 Fiss, School Desegregation: The Uncertain Path of the Law, 4 PHILOSOPHY & PUB.
AFFAIRS 3, 16-17 (1974).
"' Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 96 S. Ct. 2697, 2703 (1976); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 24 (1971).
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that school board decisions disserving racial balance be justified
by a showing that alternative courses, less hostile to racial bal-
ance, are impractical. 1 62 DRI theory requires only that school
officials act in ways that improve rather than impair racial bal-
ance, where it is not unreasonable to do so. 16 3 Although it is
162 DRI theory certainly does not prevent the Supreme Court from laying down
equitable ground rules for "practicality," such as the rule that under normal circum-
stances court-ordered remedial action shall respect school district lines. In effect, the
Supreme Court laid down this particular ground rule in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S.
717 (1974) (reversing the district court's grant of multidistrict relief where no showing
was made either that there had been purposeful racial segregation in the school districts
outside Detroit or that district lines had been drawn with a discriminatory purpose). See
Hills v. Gautreaux, 96 S. Ct. 1538 (1976): "[T]he Milliken decision was based on basic
limitations on the exercise of the equity power of federal courts and not on a balancing of
particular considerations presented by school desegregation cases." Id. at 1544 (em-
phasis supplied). Understood as relying on equitable doctrine, Milliken is consistent with
the requirement of DRI theory that actions by school administrators have as favorable
an impact on racial imbalance as is practical given the circumstances. Milliken and
Gautreaux seem to leave open the possibility that state courts can fashion equitable de-
crees in desegregation suits broader than the decrees that federal courts can fashion.
In Washington v. Davis, Justice White rejected DRI theory. White dissented in
Milliken, contending that multidistrict relief was in order. In Milliken, however, multidis-
trict relief was in order, if at all, only on the theory that the underlying right was a
right to a racially balanced education where practical. This right logically derives from
the nonmotivational, disproportionate impact theory of racial discrimination. If in
Milliken the basic right was to have school officials not use race as a criterion of selec-
tion, multidistrict relief would have been inappropriate because the Milliken plaintiffs
would not have been attending schools outside the Detroit district even if race had never
been used as a criterion of selection inside the Detroit district. No evidence in Milliken
indicated purposeful racial discrimination in the districts outside Detroit or in the draw-
ing of any district lines. Thus, Justice White's position in Milliken logically entails the
nonmotivational theory of racial discrimination that he rejected in Washington.
A further point merits mention here. If the presumed advantages of neighborhood
schools, see Fiss, supra note 150, at 566-67; Kaplan, Segregation Litigation and the Schools
-Part II: The General Northern Problem, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 157, 178 (1963) (chiefly
avoidance of transportation and associational interests), are weighted so heavily that the
interest in neighborhood schools is, in effect, deemed paramount, then there is no
point in applying DRI theory, because the interest in maintaining neighborhood
schools, in nearly every case of consequence, would justify racial imbalance. Only means
short of disestablishing the neighborhood school would be held practical. Thus, a
judgment implicit in application of DRI theory to school administration is that the in-
terest in racial balance is weightier than the interest in neighborhood schools.
163 The recent Atlanta school case, Calhoun v. Cook, 522 F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1975),
demonstrates that sensitive application of DRI theory to school administration need not
yield unrealistic results. More than 85% of Atlanta's 80,000 public school students are
black; 92 of 148 public schools are over 90% black, and black citizens "occupy the
majority of posts on the school board, .. . two-thirds of the posts in the school ad-
ministration and staff and ... over sixty percent of the faculty." Id. at 719. In rejecting
a plea that the defendant school board be required to improve racial balance through
"the transportation, zoning and pairing of white students into predominantly black
schools," id. at 718, the court of appeals reasoned that "[]n Atlanta, where white stu-
dents now comprise a small minority and black citizens can control school policy, ad-
ministration and staffing," the degree of racial balance in the Atlanta schools is constitu-
tionally adequate, id. at 719. It might be argued that the court in Calhoun implicitly
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rather quixotic to expect racially balanced classrooms to cure
racial intolerance singlehandedly, at least they do not nurture it;
in addition, they can help foster the mutual understanding that
precedes tolerance.
164
The Supreme Court has insisted on maintaining the distinc-
tion between dejure and de facto school segregation. The Court
has said that "the differentiating factor" between the two is
"purpose or intent to segregate."'165 The Court, however, has never
rejected the disproportionate impact test that governs school desegregation cases in the
Fifth Circuit. See, e.g., United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 532 F.2d 380 (5th Cir.
1976) (impact test formulated in terms of the "intent" fiction discussed in notes 165-71
infra & accompanying text); Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School Dist., 467
F.2d 142, 149 (5th Cir. 1972) ("Discriminatory motive and purpose, while they may
reinforce a finding of effective segregation, are not necessary ingredients of constitu-
tional violations in the field of public education."). This argument ignores the fact that
Cisneros, Calhoun, and Texas Education Agency were all decided by unanimous panels.
Judge John Minor Wisdom was a member of each panel and the author of the court's
opinions in Cisneros and Texas Education Agency. It is unlikely that Judge Wisdom would
have failed to comment had the Calhoun panel rejected the test he had formulated in
Cisneros and preserved in Texas Education Agency.
14 See note 154 supra. Of course, a community's reaction to a court's desegregation
order, as in Boston, can impair, in the short run, the capacity of racially balanced
schools to foster understanding and tolerance. Cf Rights Panel is Critical of Ford on
Schools, N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1976, § 4, at 4, col. 1:
The United States Civil Rights Commission has issued a lengthy report on
school desegregation that is generally positive on progress but strongly critical
of the Ford Administration. The burden of the Commission's findings was that
desegregation works peacefully where communities and community leaders
want it to; Mr. Ford's legislative proposals to limit the Federal judiciary's bus-
ing authority, the commission said, encourages community resistance.
Not insignificantly, DRI theory relieves a school desegregation plaintiff of the bur-
den of establishing that the challenged action was racially motivated. Establishing
discriminatory purpose in school desegregation suits can be very difficult and time
consuming. DRI theory makes it less likely that a plan motivated by a concealed dis-
criminatory purpose would be upheld.
With respect to the ever-present possibility of covert racial discrimination in school
administration, the following is instructive:
The old Jim Crow notion that separate schools for the races were all right
as long as they were equal has, of course, been unconstitutional since the U.S.
Supreme Court handed down its landmark 1954 decision on Brown v. Board of
Education of Topeka (Kans.). Nonetheless, the state of Missouri never got around
to deleting a clause from its own constitution calling for "separate schools...
for white and colored children." Last week the state's voters were finally given
a chance to do so. With 90% of the tally in, the proposition to kill the clause
was passed, but by the surprisingly close margin of 527,000 to 390,000.
The number of voters who wanted to keep the provision in the Missouri
constitution was a sad reminder of the latent opposition, never too far below
the surface, to integrated schools in the U.S.-22 years after the Supreme
Court spoke so emphatically on the issue.
Missouri Compromised, TsIE, Aug. 16, 1976, at 8.
165 Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973) (emphasis in original). See
also 20 U.S.C. § 1705 (Supp. V 1975) (plan for assignment of students on a neighbor-
hood basis does not violate the equal protection clause unless instituted for the purpose
of segregation).
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explicitly decided "whether intentional action leading foresee-
ably to [racial imbalance], but taken without racial motivation,
might not also constitute de jure discrimination.' 1 66 Several fed-
eral courts of appeals, laboring under the Supreme Court's de
jure-de facto distinction but persuaded that a disproportionate
impact test should govern school desegregation suits, have re-
sorted to a fiction that enables the lower courts to cast their
opinions in terms of "intent" and "de jure" segregation even
though they focus not on discriminatory purpose but on effects,
in terms of racial balance. The courts' theory is that school
boards "intend" the natural, foreseeable consequences of their
actions. Under this theory, if a school board's action has the
effect-which will always be "natural" and "foreseeable" because
it is no secret which neighborhoods are predominantly black and
which are not-of creating or maintaining racially imbalanced
schools, then the school board is said to "intend" the effect and
thus to create "de jure" segregation.
16 7
The theory is a fiction. It rests on a bastardization of the
concept of intent. The "discriminatory purpose" or "intent" that
the Supreme Court has invariably required as an element of
unconstitutional racial discrimination is the deliberate use of race
as a criterion of selection.' 68 This is intent as motivation. The
intent on which the lower courts rely does not denote the delib-
erate use of a racial criterion but consists of foreknowledge of
result. This is intent as knowledge; whether or not the result was
166 Hart v. Community School Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37, 49 (2d Cir. 1975) (discus-
sing Keyes).
167 This fiction, endorsed by Professor Fiss in 1965, Fiss, supra note 150, at 584-85,
is widely used. See, e.g., United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 532 F.2d 380, 388 (5th
Cir. 1976) ("[A] person intends the natural and foreseeable consequences of his ac-
tions."); Hart v. Community School Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37, 50, 51 (2d Cir. 1975)
("[A] finding of de jure segregation may be based on actions taken, coupled with omis-
sions made, by governmental authorities which have the natural and foreseeable conse-
quence of causing education segregation."). Occasionally, the fiction is phrased in terms
of a presumption of segregative design, which a school board can rebut only by proving
that its challenged action, creating racially imbalanced schools, was not racially moti-
vated. United States v. School Dist., 521 F.2d 530, 535-36 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 96
S. Ct. 361 (1975) ("[A] presumption of segregative intent arises once it is established
that school authorities have engaged in acts or omissions, the natural, probable and
foreseeable consequence of which is to bring about or maintain segregation."); Oliver v.
State Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178, 182 (6th Cir. 1974). Given the extraordinary diffi-
culty of establishing the absence of racial motivation, the presumption of segregative
design is, for practical purposes, the equivalent of a conclusive presumption.
16 8 See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1971).
Indeed, that is precisely what Washington v. Davis is all about. The Washington Court
cites the de jure-de facto distinction in school desegregation cases in support of its
rejection of nonmotivational theory of racial discrimination. 96 S. Ct. at 2048.
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desired is simply not relevant. 6 9 The intent fiction effectively
collapses the distinction between de jure and de facto segrega-
tion. Under the fiction, the use of the neighborhood criterion of
selection, when it naturally and foreseeably leads to racially im-
balanced neighborhood schools, constitutes de jure segregation
even though such schools have always been regarded as "segre-
gated" only in a de facto or adventitious sense.' 70 Use of the
intent fiction is simply a mask for application of the dispropor-
tionate impact theory of racial discrimination to school deseg-
regation cases. It is difficult to perceive any principled basis on
which the Supreme Court can accept the intent fiction in the
context of school desegregation while rejecting DRI theory,
which the fiction masks, in every other context.
17 1
3. Land Use Policy
Because a disproportionate number of persons with low in-
come are black, land use decisions that prevent or seriously im-
pede the construction of low income housing communities dis-
proportionately disadvantage black Americans in their pursuit of
decent housing. Perhaps more importantly, such decisions have
the substantial effect of reinforcing residential racial isolation by
fencing the poor, who are disproportionately black, out of pre-
dominantly white, relatively affluent communities and into ra-
cially isolated neighborhoods.' 72 Moreover, because businesses
and jobs increasingly are fleeing the cities for the urban fringe
or suburban areas, making it even more difficult for inner city
blacks to get work, exclusionary land use decisions aggravate the
economic deprivation of blacks by fueling black unemploy-
ment. 173 Economic deprivation and racial isolation are mutually
169See, e.g., Hart v. Community School Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37, 51 (2d Cir.
1975) ("[A] lack of racial motivation [is] irrelevant in the face ... of a foreseeable
effect.").
17
1 See P. BREST, supra note 55, at 530 n.81.
171 Justice Powell has argued forthrightly against the de jure-de facto distinction.
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 219 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring). If Justice
Powell supports application of a disproportionate impact test in school desegregation
cases, then he should have explained, in Washington, why he rejected the disproportion-
ate impact test in the context of public employment.
172See, e.g., Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517
F.2d 409 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 560 (1975), discussed in notes 181-92 infra &
accompanying text. Land use practices exacerbating racial isolation include require-
ments of minimum lot size, exclusion of multifamily dwellings, and limitations on the
number of bedrooms per housing unit. See Comment, Applying the Title VII Prima Facie
Case to Title VIII Litigation, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 128, 132-33 & n.30 (1976).
173 See note 140 supra.
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reinforcing: poverty makes it difficult to escape racially isolated
neighborhoods, and racial isolation makes it difficult to escape
poverty. If ever there were a vicious circle, economic deprivation
and racial isolation describe it. 174 Exclusionary land use decisions
therefore have a disproportionate racial impact because they
disproportionately disadvantage blacks in their pursuit of decent
housing and employment. In addition, and more fundamentally,
racial isolation is an incubator of racial discrimination.17 5
A decision not to apply DRI theory to exclusionary land use
decisions would overlook the nature and gravity of the underly-
ing social problems. Racial polarization is increasing, as the
Kerner Commission warned eight years ago. 176 Whites are flee-
ing the cities in growing numbers, and blacks remain behind in
neglected, disintegrating, even devastated neighborhoods. 77 Be-
174 Economic deprivation and racial isolation also impair the motivation and ability
of many black children to succeed in school, with the result that many young blacks are
not well equipped to overcome the effects of discrimination. See Fiss, supra note 97, at
239. Thus, the vicious circle widens.
175 See note 99 supra.
Housing authorities' decisions that locate low income housing in areas of racial
isolation also have a disproportionate impact because they reinforce residential racial
isolation and its concomitant economic deprivation. Federal law now mandates that
housing officials locate housing to improve racial balance. See Hills v. Gautreaux, 96
S. CL 1538, 1548-49 (1976). Therefore, as a practical matter, the issue of the applicabil-
ity of DRI theory to site selection decisions is academic. Whether federal law governs
land use decisions having a disproportionate racial impact, however, is uncertain. One
commentator has ably argued that the fair housing provisions of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, tit. VIII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1970), should be construed as embodying a
disproportionate impact test similar to that of Title VII. Comment, supra note 172, at
150-74. The circuits are split on the issue whether impact or motive is the proper test
under Title VIII. Compare United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184-85
(8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 2656 (1975) (impact), with Boyd v. Lefrak Organi-
zation, 509 F.2d 1110, 1113-14 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 197 (1975) (motive). An
exclusionary land use decision can effectively impede the implementation of national
housing policy by preventing a federally-funded housing authority, or a private de-
veloper under contract with the United States Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment, from locating low income housing in an area where it would improve racial
balance. See Hills v. Gautreaux, 96 S. Ct. at 1550 (HUD's actions cannot "displace the
rights and powers accorded local government entities under federal or state housing
statutes or existing land use laws." (emphasis supplied)).
176 REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL
DISORDERS (1968).
177 See Comment, supra note 172, at 129-30:
The pervasiveness of segregated living patterns is starkly demonstrated by
recent estimates that by the year 2000 the population of our cities will be ap-
proximately 75 percent black and 25 percent white, and that to achieve equal
demographic dispersion of blacks and whites at present would require the
relocation of some 80 to ninety percent of all blacks in the country.
In addition, minority city dwellers are often limited to housing which is
over-priced and of substandard quality. Several studies have indicated, for ex-
ample, that approximately two-thirds of all nonwhite families in central cities
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cause businesses are leaving the city too, residential racial isola-
tion, as we have observed, contributes to black unemployment
(and underemployment) and severe economic deprivation.17
Moreover, racially isolated neighborhoods lead to racially imbal-
anced classrooms, where the deprivation and the familial and
social disintegration often so apparent in the streets are fre-
quently mirrored. 179 To fail to apply DRI theory to exclusionary
land use decisions is to fail to ask more than minimal justifica-
tion for actions that grievously compound the legacy of slavery
and discrimination.
1 8 0
Application of DRI theory would not result in the invalida-
tion of each and every land use decision having a disproportion-
ate racial impact, but it certainly would minimize and moderate
such decisions. How DRI theory would affect land use decisions
is usefully illustrated by a case that the Supreme Court will re-
view during the 1976 term, Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights. "' Metropolitan involved a con-
stitutional challenge to a refusal by Arlington Heights to rezone
a parcel of land to permit Metropolitan, a nonprofit corporation,
to construct housing for persons of low and moderate income.
live in neighborhoods marked by substandard housing and that nonwhites in
urban areas receive an average of 30 percent less value for their housing dollar
because of their race. (footnotes omitted)
178 This economic deprivation, because of the costs of social welfare programs and
crime, disserves the economic well-being of the entire society. See Metropolitan Hous.
Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409, 414 n.2 (1975), quoted in text
accompanying note 187 infra; TRB: Blacks and Whites, NEw REPUBLIC, Apr. 10, 1976,
at 2.1t9 School busing is obviously a derivative issue: the real problem is residential racial
isolation, without which there would be no need for school busing. See TRB: Blacks and
Whites, supra note 178.
180 See note 174 supra & accompanying text.
We ought not to overlook the glaring, sad fact that exclusionary land use decisions
can effectively conceal a desire for racially "pure" communities. See note 104 supra. See
also notes 99, 107, 175 supra. The virulent motivation that for so long generated overt
racial discrimination in housing has now, to some extent, been sublimated; but it has
not disappeared, and it is either quixotic or dishonest for courts to act as if it had. This
motivation has merely found more respectable outlets, such as exclusionary zoning
policies. There is an intrinsic check on covert discrimination in employment: the desire
to run a profitable business and so to hire the best, or cheapest, labor available, black or
white. But no similar countervailing interest exists in the context of housing and land
use policy. To permit, as a constitutional matter, land use decisions to frustrate the
racial depolarization of American society, and to forbid only decisions whose "dis-
criminatory purpose" is evidentiarily apparent, is to strike the shadow but yield the
substance: "[C]lever men may easily conceal their motivations." United States v. City of
Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir. 1974); see Comment, supra note 172, at
151-52.
181 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 560 (1975); see Note, Zoning
-Equal Protection, 1976 Wisc. L. REV. 234.
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The Seventh Circuit rejected Metropolitan's claim that the re-
fusal was motivated by a discriminatory purpose. 182 The court
indicated that disproportionate racial impact-a greater percen-
tage of blacks than whites would have qualified for the proposed
housing-by itself, is not conclusive,183 acknowledging, in effect,
that under DRI theory more factors must be weighed than the
bare fact of disproportionate impact. In evaluating the constitu-
tional adequacy of Arlington Heights' refusal to rezone, the
court focused on the racial demography of the metropolitan
region of which Arlington Heights is a part and on alternatives
for supplying the needed housing while diminishing the residen-
tial racial isolation of the surrounding region.'
8 4
The population of Arlington Heights, a suburban township
on the outskirts of Chicago, was 64,884 in 1970. Of this number,
only twenty-seven were black.' 85 Moreover, as the court de-
scribed it:
The four-township northwest Cook County area, of
which Arlington Heights is a part, had a population
increase from 1960 to 1970 of 219,000 people, but only
170 of these were black. Indeed, the percentage of
blacks in this area actually decreased over this ten-year
span while the percentage of the population in the en-
tire Chicago metropolitan area that was black increased
from fourteen percent to eighteen percent.'
86
The impact of [these statistics] can be fully ap-
preciated only in the context of the shift in employment
opportunities during that same period. While the City
of Chicago lost 230,000 jobs, the number of jobs in the
four-township Arlington Heights area rose from
100,000 to 200,000. Blacks, however, have not been
able to take full advantage of these job opportunities. In
1970 only 137 of the 13,000 people who worked in
Arlington Heights were black. Part of the explanation
for this is that many black workers have been unable to
find housing they can afford in Arlington Heights. A
182 517 F.2d at 412.
183Id. at 412-13.
184 Metropolitan was to receive federal financing, and national housing policy man-
dates that sites for federally-assisted low income housing be selected for the purpose of
improving racial balance. See note 175 supra.
185 517 F.2d at 413-14.
186 Id. at 414 (footnote omitted).
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study issued by the Cook County Office of Economic
Opportunity indicated that based on its survey almost
all the black workers in Arlington Heights resided in
Chicago. Moreover, the report stated that one of the
main problems Arlington Heights' employers faced in
hiring minorities was the lack of adequate housing
within a reasonable distance of their plants. 18
7
Given the extent of the surrounding racial isolation, the
court next examined whether there were any alternatives for
supplying the needed housing while diminishing the racial isola-
tion, and it concluded that no "economically feasible and suit-
able" sites for low and moderate income housing, other than the
one selected by Metropolitan, existed in Arlington Heights.
188
The alternative of building the needed housing outside Arling-
ton Heights, in an area of greater minority concentration, would
have done nothing to diminish the racial isolation in Arlington
Heights or in the greater Chicago area. 18 9 In fine-tuning its bal-
ance, the court noted that Arlington Heights "has not sponsored
nor participated in any low income housing developments, nor
does the record reflect any such plans for the future."' 90 The
Seventh Circuit's evaluation of the disproportionate impact of
Arlington Heights' refusal to rezone was both thorough and
balanced-an exemplary illustration of DRI theory applied to
land use decisions. 91 Although application of DRI theory to
land use decisions will not always yield easy answers, the answer
in Metropolitan was clear, and the court was correct: the refusal to
rezone was unjustified.
92
'
8
1 Id. at 414 n.2.
' 881d. at 414.
189 Presumably if there were a township in the vicinity of Arlington Heights with a
higher percentage of white residents, locating the needed housing in that township
would do more to diminish the racially imbalanced demography of the surrounding
region than locating the housing in Arlington Heights. No such township existed. See id.
at 414 n.1.
1" Id. at 414.
,9, Other cases have endorsed the application of disproportionate impact theory to
land use decisions. See, e.g., Crow v. Brown, 457 F.2d 788, 790 (5th Cir. 1972); Gau-
treaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731, 738 (7th Cir. 1971) (dictum); Kennedy Park Homes
Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108, 114 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010
(1971); Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. Union City, 424 F.2d 291, 295-96
(9th Cir. 1970).
192 The Court's decision in Metropolitan did not intrude seriously on Arlington
Heights' fiscal or environmental interests. See 517 F.2d at 411 (referring to "studies
showing that Lincoln Green [the proposed development] would not cause major traffic
problems and would make a net contribution to the Village in terms of taxes"); id. at
415:
DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT THEORY
A decision by the Supreme Court rejecting the dispropor-
tionate impact theory of racial discrimination in the context of
land use decisions like that challenged in Metropolitan would
effectively constitute a declaration that, notwithstanding the
collective societal responsibility for the racial isolation and the
especially severe economic deprivation of black Americans, and
notwithstanding the consequences of that isolation, including
diminished employment opportunities and inferior schooling,
a municipality has virtually unbounded discretion under the
fourteenth amendment, no matter what the surrounding cir-
cumstances might be, to make land use decisions exacerbating
the racial isolation and economic deprivation of blacks in Amer-
ica.193 Whatever the verbiage in which it is packaged, that dec-
laration is ethically barren and, as a matter of equal protection
theory, sorely deficient.
19 4
Lincoln Green will not be a high-rise development, but merely a cluster of
two-story townhouses no higher than the surrounding single family homes. As
noted by two dissenting members of the Arlington Heights Plan Commission,
in terms of density, architecture and most other characteristics, such town-
houses are more similar to [single family] dwellings than to [multi-family]
buildings. The planning rationale behind the buffer zone policy has only min-
imal applicability to this type of low-rise, open-space development.
Note that Metropolitan involved a challenge to a refusal to rezone a particular parcel.
of land. Such challenges, because narrowly focused, are much more manageable for the
judiciary than are challenges to municipal zoning schemes in toto. See Note, The Inade-
quay of Judicial Remedies in Cases of Exclusionary Zoning, 74 MIcH. L. REv. 760, 760 n.4
(1976).
19' After all, virtually any land use decision will satisfy minimal scrutiny because it
will be rationally related to a legitimate, typically environmental, objective.
In James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), the Supreme Court upheld over an
equal protection challenge a California constitutional provision requiring that no fed-
erally- or state-assisted low income housing development could be located in a commu-
nity unless the development were approved by that community in a referendum. The
Court in Valtierra did not address directly the issue of disproportionate racial impact,
but, in Washington v. Davis, the Court cited Valtierra as support for rejecting DRI theory.
96 S. Ct at 2048. DRI theory would not have helped the plaintiffs in Valtierra, because
their challenge was directed at the referendum provision in abstracto and not at a par-
ticular referendum allegedly having a disproportionate racial impact. The dispropor-
tionate impact theory applies to challenges to specific decisions, as in Metropolitan, or
practices, as in Washington, enabling a court to determine if the specific decision or
practice has a disproportionate racial impact. A facially neutral referendum provision,
like that challenged in Valtierra, has no impact. Only particular referenda pursuant to
the provision have impact, and whether a particular referendum has an impact that
cannot be justified depends on the particular circumstances involved. Thus, Valtierra is
not authority for rejecting DRI theory in the context of particular land use decisions.
194 To the extent the Supreme Court is willing to concede to Congress the power,
under the fourteenth amendment, to apply a disproportionate impact test to state and
local land use and housing policies-perhaps Congress has already done this, see note
175 supra-a ruling by the Supreme Court in Metropolitan that the equal protection
clause contemplates only motivational modes of racial discrimination would encounter
the problem discussed in note 148 supra.
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VI. CONCLUSION: A QUESTION OF JUDICIAL ROLE
In Washington v. Davis, the Supreme Court failed to come to
grips with the very theory it rejected. The Court failed to under-
stand that the disproportionate impact theory of racial discrimi-
nation has a limited jurisdiction-that the theory, if accepted,
would not govern, for example, jury selection or legislative dis-
tricting. The Court also failed to understand that in the contexts
in which it would apply, the theory contemplates a flexible stan-
dard of review, requiring more of government than minimal
rationality, but less than the strict justification demanded when
the government has employed race or its functional equivalent as
a criterion of selection. Moreover, the Court made no effort to
isolate and to evaluate the underlying premises of DRI theory,
especially the collective moral responsibility of American society
for the legacy of slavery and racial discrimination that is the
underlying cause of disproportionate racial impact.
To some extent the issue whether DRI theory-a constitu-
tional theory of equal protection-should be accepted has been
mooted by legislation. For example, Title VII now subjects hir-
ing and promotion practices in public employment to a dispro-
portionate impact test. 195 And Title VIII has been construed by
at least one federal court of appeals to subject exclusionary land
use practices to a disproportionate impact test.196 Nonetheless,
the integrity of DRI theory as constitutional doctrine is indepen-
dent of mooting legislation, and the theory merits close examina-
tion for that reason alone.
197
After DRI theory is better understood, what will likely sepa-
rate those who endorse the theory from those who reject it is a
conception of judicial function. Under DRI theory, a court is
called upon to balance the interests of racial minorities against
the interests reflected by the laws or practices in issue. The un-
derlying notion is not that courts singlehandedly can remedy the
ills afflicting the legatees of slavery and racial oppression, but
that the courts can require agencies of government to attend to
the interests of racial minorities with greater sensitivity.
195 See note 149 supra.
19 United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974).
1'97 Moreover, the integrity of a disproportionate racial impact theory in the con-
stitutional context is plainly relevant to the integrity of the theory in a statutory context
because the underlying premises and considerations are similar in both contexts. In
fact, the legitimacy of adopting a statutory disproportionate impact test may depend on
whether the Constitution is construed to embody such a test. See note 148 supra.
DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT THEORY
Legislatures and other government agencies are not as sen-
sitive to the interests of racial minorities as to majoritarian in-
terests. 198 Occasionally, a legislature will overlook less intrusive
ways of advancing its objectives and, instead, will infringe
thoughtlessly and needlessly on the interests of racial minorities.
As Judge Wright observed, "the arbitrary quality of thoughtless-
ness can be as disastrous and unfair to private rights and public
interest as the perversity of a willful scheme."'19 9 One important,
even basic, function of the judiciary in American government, in
constitutional cases, is to guard against thoughtless legislative
inattention to even the legitimate interests of those "discrete and
insular" minorities whose political voice is not always sufficiently
audible.2 °° It is difficult to discern any sound reason why the
judiciary should abdicate that salutary function, in the exercise
of which courts have made what is surely an estimable contribu-
tion to the ethical character of American politics and govern-
ment. Surely that function is no less important because inevitably
limited in its impact.
On September 6, 1976, Time Magazine reported:
Armed with shotguns, Magnums, carbines and
clubs, teams of men sweep the streets enforcing a 10
p.m. to 6 a.m. curfew for everyone under 18. Citizens
cower behind the barricaded doors of their own homes,
listening to the shots and shouts that punctuate the
night air. The city is not Beirut or Belfast but Detroit,
whose agonies are every bit as real and whose conflicts
seem equally impossible to eradicate.
After weeks of gang terrorism that included kill-
ings, a near riot, robberies, pillaging and rape, Detroit's
black mayor, Coleman Young, belatedly rushed back
"58 See Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 507-08 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub non. Smuck
v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969):
Judicial deference to [legislative] judgments is predicated in the confidence
courts have that they are just resolutions of conflicting interests. This confi-
dence is often misplaced when the vital interests of the poor and of racial
minorities are involved. For these groups are not always assured of a full and
fair hearing through the ordinary political processes, not so much because of
the chance of outright bias, but because of the abiding danger that the power
structure-a term which need carry no disparaging or abusive overtones-may
incline to pay little heed to even the deserving interests of a politically voiceless
and invisible minority.
199 Id. at 497.
2
11See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938);
Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1311, 1315
(1976).
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from vacation and vowed last week, "We will not toler-
ate lawlessness in the streets. We will stand for it no
longer." . . .
• . . [T]he malaise that grips the decaying motor
capital is unlikely to yield to short-term measures like a
curfew-and even less to mere rhetoric and good inten-
tions. As John Cardinal Dearden, the Archbishop of
Detroit, put it last week, "We are called upon to rebuild
the structure."
The problems that plague Detroit (pop. 1.4 million)
differ only in magnitude from those that afflect other
large cities in the U.S.: an eroding tax base as affluent
whites abandon the core city; reduced services, includ-
ing police protection; widespread unemployment, par-
ticularly among black youths; neighborhoods where
housing and other buildings have been allowed to de-
teriorate; and low-quality schools. Perhaps more de-
bilitating than any of these is a growing feeling that
nothing will-or can-be done to reverse the trend.
20 1
Whether anything can or will be done to reverse the trend is an
open question. The courts can play a role in answering that
question. The most troubling aspect of Washington v. Davis is not
that the Court's opinion was deficient analytically but that the
Court seemed to say that the judiciary shall play a severely di-
minished role in ameliorating racial inequities.
Questions concerning the proper relationship between the
judiciary and nonjudicial agencies of government-between
legislative will and judicial limit-are perennial and inexhaust-
ible. Such questions rarely have one "right" answer.20 2 In this
respect, it is really not possible to say that the Supreme Court's
rejection of DRI theory-and its implicit rejection of the judicial
role contemplated by the theory-was "wrong." Whatever one's
position with respect to the issue of judicial role, however, surely
it is perplexing that the Court in Washington v. Davis gave virtu-
ally no evidence of an effort to comprehend and evaluate the
theory it rejected. Given the importance of the issues involved,
2,, A Long, Hot Summer for Detroit, TIME, Sept. 6, 1976, at 16.
212 Compare Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J.
1, 1-20 (1971), and Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693
(1976), with A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
(1976), and Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical Function of
Substantive Due Process, 23 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 689, 707-22 (1976).
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DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT THEORY
the Court's performance was especially lamentable. During the
1976 term, the Court will again have occasion to consider dis-
proportionate impact theory.0 3 The Court would do well to give
the theory a fuller airing.*
...See Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d
409 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 560 (1975), discussed in notes 181-92 supra & ac-
companying text.
* On Jan. 11, 1977-after this Article went to press-the Supreme Court decided
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 45 U.S.L.W. 4073 (U.S.
Jan. 11, 1977), reaffirming the principle of Washington v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 2040 (1976),
that a showing of discriminatory purpose is necessary to make out a claim of racial dis-
crimination under the equal protection clause. 45 U.S.L.W. at 4077. The Court re-
versed the Seventh Circuit's judgment and remanded the case for consideration of the
claim that the challenged zoning decision violated the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3601-3631 (1970). 45 U.S.L.W. at 4078-79; see note 175 supra. The Court's decision
-even its failure to reexamine the reasoning of Washington-came as no surprise; in
Washington, the Court indicated its disapproval of the Seventh Circuit's Arlington Heights
decision in a footnote. 96 S. Ct. at 2050 n.12. What was surprising, however, was that
both Justice Marshall and Justice Brennan joined in the reaffirmance of the Washington
principle, a principle that neither Justice had found necessary to address in Washington.
See id. at 2056 n. 1. One would have thought that Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion
in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70 (1973), would
have led him in Arlington Heights to demand a scrutiny of the zoning decision stricter
than the relaxed, "rational basis" scrutiny authorized by Washington. Cf. Brennan,
State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489, 501 (1977)
(suggesting admiration for the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Southern
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal
dismissed & cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) (invalidating town's exclusionary zoning
ordinance on basis of state constitution's due process clause)).
Doubtless Arlington Heights will be a source of much commentary. Even the popular
press has taken notice. Compare Will, Common Sense on Race, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 24, 1977,
at 80, with Wicker, Tightening the Ring, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1977, § 4, at 17, col. 5. One
of the most interesting facets of the decision is its implicit overruling of Palmer v. Thomp-
son, 403 U.S. 217 (1971). In Palmer, the Court ruled that a law or practice plausibly
related to a discriminatory objective but, nonetheless, rationally related to a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory objective as well would be upheld and that an inquiry into motivation
would not be undertaken. See text accompanying notes 36-40 & 47-49 supra. In Arling-
ton Heights, however, the Court ruled that "proof that a discriminatory purpose has
been a motivating factor in the [challenged] decision," 45 U.S.L.W. at 4077, shifts to the
defender of the decision "the burden of establishing that the same decision would have
resulted even had the impermissible purpose not been considered," id. at 4078 n.21. But
the Court's novel readiness to engage in motivational inquiry even when a law or practice
is rationally related to a legitimate objective is without much practical significance.
After all, it would be a rare case indeed in which the defender of a decision could not
make the required showing-unless, perhaps, his burden of proof on the issue is severe.
Thus, the implicit overruling of Palmer-plainly an attempt by the Court to diminish
the possibility that municipalities will "take advantage" of the Arlington Heights decision
-seems more apparent than real.
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